

what is probable to what is true, were thought no proper teachers of the art, for so he signifies, too, in his Phwdrus. R 2. Cornelius Celsus, moreover, may be thought to have been of the same opinion with those to whom I have just referred, for his words are, *the orator aims only at the semblance of truth*; and he adds, a little after, *not purity of conscience, but the victory of his client, is the reward of the pleader*. Were such assertions true, it would become only the worst of men to give such pernicious weapons to the most mischievous of characters, and to aid dishonesty with precepts; but let those who hold this opinion consider what ground they have for it.

33. Let me, for my part, as I have undertaken to form a *perfect orator*, whom I would have, above all, to be *a good man*, return to those who have better thoughts of the art. Some have pronounced oratory to be indeititcal with *civil polity*; Cicero calls it *a part of civil polity*; and *a knowledge of civil polity*, he thinks, is nothing less than wisdom itself. Some have made it a part of *philosophy*, among whom is Isocrates.* 34. With this charactert of it, the definition that *oratory is the science of speaking well*, agrees excellently, for it embraces all the virtues of oratory at once, and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man. 35. To the same purpose is the definition of Chrysippus, derived from Cleanthes⁴ *the science of speaking properly*. There are more definitions in the same philosopher, but they relate rather to other§ questions. A definition framed in these terms, *to persuade to what is necessary*, would convey the same notion, except that it makes the art

* This we may suppose to have been said in the lost treatise mentioned in sect. 4. In the rest of his writings lie is accustomed to use the word *philosophy* with more latitude than was usual; as in the Panegyric, *τῆς εἰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐπιλογοῦσας*. *Spalding*.

[*t Buic ejus substantive.*] That is, *ouaig.*, *ouael*, *cδsenticc*, *natura*; *si nimirum hanc esse rhetorices essentiali, naturam, substautiam, statuerimus*. *Cappronier*.

§ "Cleanthes wrote a treatise on the art of rhetoric, and so did Chrysippus, but their writings were of such a nature that if a man wished his mouth closed for ever he has nothing to do but read them." Cic. do Fin. iv. 3. In their definition the expression doubtless was *400ZCC* Xiyfty, instead of 6 Aiyety, which is found in Sext. Enlpir. p. 289, and Diog. Laert. vii. 42. *Spaldinnq*.

Not to this, whether eloquence is to be attributed to a good man only.

depend on the result. 36. Areus* defines oratory well, say in" that it *is to speak according to the excellence of speech*. Those also exclude bad men from oratory who consider it as the knowledge of civil duties, since they deem such knowledge virtue; but they confine it within too narrow bounds, and to political questions. Albutius,± no obscure professor or author, allows that it is the *art of speaking well*, but errs in giving it 4imitations, adding, *on political questions*, and *with probability*, of both which restrictions I have already disposed; those, too, are men of good intention, who consider it the business of oratory *to think and speak rightly*.

37. These are almost all the most celebrated definitions, and those about which there is the most controversy; for to discuss all would neither be much to the purpose, nor would be in my power; since a foolish desire, as I think, has prevailed among the writers of treatises on rhetoric, to define nothing in the same terms that another had already used; a vain-glorious practice which shall be far from me. 38. For I shall say, not what I shall invent, but what I shall approve as, for instance, that *oratory is the art of speaking well*; since, when the best definition is found, he who seeks for another must seek for a worse.

This being admitted, it is evident at the same time what object, what highest and ultimate end, oratory has; that object, or end which is called in Greek *τιξος*, and to which every art tends; for if oratory be *the art of speaking well*, its object and ultimate end must be *to speak well*.

CHAPTER, XVI.

Oratory said by some to be a pernicious art, because it may be perverted to bad ends, § 1-4. We might say the same of other things that are allowed to be beneficial, 5. 6. Its excellences, 7-16. The abundant return that it makes for cultivation, 17-19.

1. Next comes the question *whether oratory is useful*; for

* He may possibly have been the Stoic philosopher of Alexandria, for whose sake Cesar Octavianus spared that city; see Plut. in Anton. p. 953 A. His name is sometimes written Arius, the Greek being Aioflor. See Fabric Bib]. Gr. Harl. vol. iii., p. 540. *Spalding*.
 † Cv. ius Albucius Silus, of Novaria, a rhetorician of the age of

some are accustomed to declaim violently against it, and, what is most ungenerous, to make use of the power of oratory to lay accusations against oratory ; 2. they say that *eloquence is that which saves the wicked from punishment; by the dishonesty of which the innocent are at times condemned; by which deliberations are influenced to the worse ; by which not only popular seditions and tumults, but even inexpiable wars, are excited ; and of which the efficacy is the greatest when it exerts itself for falsehood against truth.* 3. Even to Socrates, the comic writers make it a reproach' that *he taught how to make the worse reason appear the better;* and Plato on his part says that Tisias and Gorgias* professed the same art. 4. To these they add examples from Greek and Roman history, and give a list of persons who, by exerting such eloquence as was mischievous, not only to individuals but to communities, have disturbed or overthrown the constitutions of whole states ; asserting that eloquence on that account was banished from the state of Lacedaemon, and that even at Athens, where the orator was forbidden to move the passions, the powers of eloquence were in a manner curtailed.

5. Under such a mode of reasoning, neither will generals, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor even wisdom itself, be of any utility ; for Flaminius t was a general, and the Gracchi, Saturnini, and Glaucia were magistrates; in the hands of physicians poisons have been found ; and among those who abuse the name of philosophers have been occasionally detected the most, horrible crimes. 6. We must reject food, for it has often given rise to ill health ; we must never go under roofs, for they sometimes fall upon those who dwell beneath them ; a sword must not be forged for a soldier, for a robber may use the same weapon. Who does not know that fire and water, without which life cannot exist, and, (that I may not confine myself to things of earth,) that the sun and moon, the chief of the celestial luminaries, sometimes produce hurtful effects?

Augustus. See [Senec. Rhet. Contr. iii. prm. p. 197](#) Bip. ; also Sueton. de Rhet. 6.

* "Tisias and Gorgias, by the power of words, make small things great, and great things small." Plato Phaedr. p. 267, A. ; see also p. 273, A, B, C. *Spalding.*

+ The general who was defeated by Hannibal at the lake Thrasi. menus.

7. Will it be denied, however, that the blind Appius, by the force of his eloquence, broke off a dishonourable treaty of peace about to be concluded with Pyrrhus? Was not the divine eloquence of Cicero, in opposition to the agrarian laws, even popular?* Did it not quell the daring of Catiline, and [gain](#), [in](#) the toga, the honour of thanksgivings, the highest that is given to generals victorious in the field ? 8. Does not oratory often free the alarmed minds of soldiers from fear and persuade them, when they are going to face so many perils in battle, that glory is better than life ? Nor indeed would the Lacedaemonians and Athenians influence me more than the people of Rome, among whom the highest respect has always been paid to orators. 9. Nor do I think that founders of cities would have induced their unsettled multitudes to form themselves into communities by any other means than by the influence of the art of speaking ; * nor would legislators, without the utmost power of oratory, have prevailed on men to bind themselves to submit to the dominion of law. 10. Even the very rules for the conduct of life, beautiful as they are by nature, have yet greater power in forming the mind when the radiance of eloquence illumines the beauty of the precepts. Though the weapons of eloquence, therefore, have effect in both directions, it is not just that that should be accounted an evil which we may use to a good purpose.

11. But these points may perhaps be left to the consideration of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the *art of speaking well*, (the definition which I adopt,) so that a true orator must be, above all, *a good man*, it must assuredly be acknowledged that it is a useful art. 12. In truth, the sovereign deity, the parent of all things, the architect of the world, has distinguished man from other beings, such at least as were to be mortal, by nothing more than by the faculty of speech. 13. Bodily frames superior in size, in strength, in firmness, in endurance, in activity, we see among dumb

* A speech against the agrarian laws could not have been well received by the people, without being in the highest degree forcible and eloquent. "While you spoke, (O Cicero !) the tribes relinquished the agrarian law, that is, their own meat and drink." Plin. H. N. vii. 31.

t Being preliminary to a triumph, by which, however, it was illot always followed. Cie. Ep. ad Div. xv. 5.

§ See Cicero de mnv. i. 2 ; De Orat. i. 8.

creatures, and observe, too, that they have less need than we have of external assistance. To walk, to feed themselves, to swim over water, they learn, in less time than we can, from nature herself, without the aid of any other teacher. 14. Most of them, also, are equipped against cold by the produce of their own bodies; weapons for their defence are born with them; and their food lies before their faces; to supply all which wants mankind have the greatest difficulty. The divinity has therefore given us reason, superior to all other qualities, and appointed us 'to be sharers of it with the immortal gods. 15. But reason could neither profit us so much, nor manifest itself so plainly within us, if we could not express by speech what we have conceived in our minds; a faculty which we see wanting in other animals, far more than, to a certain degree, understanding and reflection. 16. For to contrive habitations, to construct nests, to bring up their young, to hatch them.* to lay up provision for the winter, to produce works inimitable by us, (as those of wax and honey,) is perhaps a proof of some portion of reason; but as, though they do such things, they are without the faculty of speech, they are called *dumb and irrational*. 17. Even to men, to whom speech has been denied, of how little avail is divine reason! If, therefore, we have received from the gods nothing more valuable than speech, what can we consider more deserving of cultivation and exercise? or in what can we more strongly desire to be superior to other men, than in that by which man himself is superior to other animals, especially as in no kind of exertion does labour more plentifully bring its reward? 18. This will be so much the more evident, if we reflect from what origin, and to what extent, the art of eloquence has advanced, and how far it may still be improved. 19. For, not to mention how beneficial it is, and how becoming in *a man of* virtue, to defend his friends, to direct a senate or people by his counsels, or to lead an army to whatever enterprise he may desire, is it not extremely honourable to attain, by the common understanding and words which all men use, so high a degree of

* Do they then bring them up before they hatch them? Yet the expression of Homer is exactly similar, *φραοφν νδ' τ-ιροvro. Spalding*. Guthrie ignorantly supposed (let me be pardoned for noticing so small a matter) that *excludere* meant to exclude the young ones from the nest when they are able to shift for themselves.

esteem and glory as to appear not to speak or plead, but, as was the case with Pericles, to hurl forth lightning and thunder?

CHAPTER XVII.

Oratory is manifestly an art, § 1-4. Yet some have denied that it is, and said that its power is wholly from nature, 5-8. Examples from other arts, 9, 10. Every one that speaks is not an orator, 11-13. Opinion of Aristotle, 14. Other charges against oratory -- that it has no peculiar subject or matter, and that it sometimes deceives, 15-18. Refutation of these charges, 19-21. Unfairly objected to it that it has no proper end, 22-26. Not pernicious because it sometimes misleads, 27-29. Another objection, that it may be exerted on either side of a question, and that it contradicts itself; answered, 30-36. Oratory is sometimes ignorant of the truth of what it asserts; but the same is the case with other arts and sciences, 36-40. Confirmation of its being an art, 41-43.

1. Timewould be no end if I should allow myself to expatiate, and indulge my inclination, on this head. Let us proceed, therefore, to the question that follows, *whether oratory be an art*. 2. That it is an art, every one of those who have given rules about eloquence has been so far from doubting, that it is shown by the very titles of their books, that they are written on *the oratorical art*; and Cicero also says, that what is called *oratory is artificial eloquence*. This distinction, it is not only orators that have claimed for themselves, (since they may be thought, perhaps, to have given their profession something more than its due,) but the philosophers, the Stoics, and most of the Peripatetics, agree with them. 3. For myself, I confess, that I was in some doubt whether I should look upon this part of the inquiry as necessary to be considered; for who is so destitute, I will not say of learning, but of the common understanding of mankind, as to imagine that the work of building, or weaving, or moulding vessels out of clay, is an *art*, but that oratory, the greatest and noblest of works, has attained such a height of excellence *without being an art*? Those, indeed, who have maintained the contrary opinion, I suppose not so much to have believed what they advanced, *as to have been desirous of exercising their powers on a subject

f difficulty, like Polycrates, when he eulogized Busiris and Lytferpnestra; though he is said also to have written the speech that was delivered against Socrates; nor would that indeed have been inconsistent with his other compositions.*

5. Some will have oratory to be a natural talent, though they do not deny that it may be assisted by art. Thus Antonius, in Cicero *de Oratore*,^t says that oratory is an effect of observation, not an art; but this is not advanced that we may receive it as true, but that the character of Antonius, an orator who tried to conceal the art that he used, may be supported. 6. But Lysias seems to have really entertained this opinion; for which the argument is, that the ignorant, and barbarians, and slaves, when they speak for themselves, say something that resembles an *exordium*, they state facts, prove, refute, and (adopting the form of a peroration) deprecate. 7. The supporters of this notion also avail themselves of certain liberties upon words, that nothing that proceeds from art was before art, but that mankind have always been able to speak for themselves and against others; that teachers of the art appeared only in later times, and first of all about the age of Lysias and Corax; + that oratory was therefore before art, and is consequently not an art. 8. As to the period, indeed, in which the teaching of oratory commenced, I am not anxious to inquire; we find Phoenix, however, in Homer, § as an instructor, not only in acting but in speaking, as well as several other orators; we see all the varieties of eloquence in the three generals, and contests in eloquence proposed among the young men, ¶ and among the figures on the shield of Achilles** are represented both law-suits and pleaders. 9.

* Because in every case he took the wrong side.

^t I. 20; ii. 7, 8. The word *observatio*, however, as Spalding observes, is not to be found in either of these places of Cicero.

§ Corax was a Sicilian, who, about n. c. 470, secured himself great influence at Syracuse by means of his oratorical powers. He is said to have been the earliest writer on rhetoric. Tisias was his pupil. See Cic. Brut. 12; de Orat. i. 20; Quint. iii. 1, 8.

¶ 11. ix. 432.

|| The *copious* style in the oratory of Nestor; the *simple* in that of Menelaus; and the *middle* in that of Ulysses. See Aol. Gell. vii. 1; Clarke ad Il. iii. 213. Capperouier thinks that Pliceux, Ulysses, Ajax are meant, the speakers in the deputation to Achilles, Iliad ix.

l Il. xv. 284: οἷον ἐπιβαεῖται ἑπὶ νῶν ὄντων.

** 11 xviii. 497-508.

It would even be sufficient for me to observe, that *everything which art has brought to perfection had its origin in nature*, else, from the number of the arts must be excluded *medicine*, which resulted from the observation of what was beneficial or detrimental to health, and which, as some think, consists wholly in experiments, for somebody had, doubtless, bound up a wound before the dressing of wounds became an art, and had allayed fever by repose and abstinence, not because he saw the reason of such regimen, but because the malady itself drove him to it. 10. Else, too, *architecture* must not be considered an art, for the first generation of men built cottages without art; nor *music*, since singing and dancing, to some sort of tune, are practised among all nations. 11. So, if *any kind of speaking whatever* is to be called oratory, I will admit that oratory existed before it was an art; but if every one that speaks is not an orator, and if men in early times did not speak as orators, our reasoners must confess that an orator is formed by art, and did not exist before art. This being admitted, another argument which they use is set aside, namely, that *that has no concern with art which a man who has not learned it can do*, but that men who have not learned oratory can make speeches. 12. To support this argument, they observe, that Demades,* a waterman, and Eschines,^t an actor, were orators; but they are mistaken; for he who has not learned to be an orator cannot properly be called one, and it may be more justly said, that those men learned late in life, than that they never learned at all; though Eschines, indeed, had some introduction to learning in his youth, as his father was a teacher; nor is it certain that Demades did not learn; and he might, by constant practice in speaking, which is the most efficient mode of learning, have made himself master of all the power of language that he ever possessed. 13. But we may safely say, that he would have been a better speaker if he had learned, for he never ventured to write out his speeches for publication, + though we know that he produced considerable effect in delivering theirs..

14. Aristotle, for the sake of investigation, as is usual with him has conceived, with his peculiar subtlety, certain arguments at

• [Sext. Empir. p. 291.](#) [Fabric. Harl. ii. p. 868.](#)
^t Demosth. pro Cor. p. 307, 314, 329, ed. Reisk.
 Cic. Brut. 9; Qu

variance with my opinion in his Gryllus;* but he has also written three books *on the art of rhetoric*, in the first of which he not only admits that it is an art, but allows it a connexion with civil polity, as well as with logic.± 15. Critolaus,+ and Athenodorus, of Rhodes, have advanced many arguments on the opposite side. Agnon,§ by the very title of his book, in which he avows that lie brings an accusation against rhetoric, has deprived himself of all claim to be trusted.11 As to Epicurus,J who shrunk from all learning, I am not at all surprised at him.

16. These reasoners say a great deal, but it is based upon few arguments; I shall therefore reply to the strongest of them in a very few words, that the discussion may not be protracted to an infinite length. 17. Their first argument is with regard to the *subject or matter*, "for all arts," they say,

have some *subject*, "as is true," but that oratory has no *peculiar subject*," an assertion which I shall subsequently prove to be false. 18. The next argument is a more false charge, for "no art," they say, "acquiesces in false conclusions, since art cannot be founded but on perception, which is always true; but that oratory adopts false conclusions, and is, consequently, not an art." 19. That oratory sometimes advances what is false instead of what is true, I will admit, but I shall not for that reason acknowledge that the speaker acquiesces in false conclusions, for it is one thing for a matter to appear in a certain light to a person himself, and another for the person to make it appear in that light to others. A general often employs false representations, as did Hannibal, when, being hemmed in by Fabius, he tied faggots to the horns of oxen, and set them on fire, and, driving the herd up the opposite hills in the night, presented to the enemy the appearance of a

* The work is lost. Gryllus was the son of Xenophon, that was killed at Mantinea. Aristotle seems to have borrowed his name; and he related, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 58, that many eulogies were written on Gryllus, even for the sake of pleasing his father. The Gryllus of Aristotle is mentioned by Diog. Laert. v. 22. *Spalding*.

† Rhet. i. 2, 1.

+ Compare ii. 15, 23. On his arguments against oratory, see Sext. *Emp.* p. 291, 292. *Spalding*.

§ Of Athenodorus and Agnon nothing certain is known. *Spalding*.

* The title of his book shows that he is not an impartial judge.

See xii. 2, 24; Cie. de Fin. i. 7.

retiring army; but Hannibal merely deceived Fabius; he himself knew very well what the reality was. 20. Theopompus, the Lacedæmonian, when, on changing clothes with his wife, he escaped from prison in the disguise of a woman, came to no false conclusion concerning himself, though he conveyed a false notion to his guards. So the orator, whenever he puts what is false for what is true, knows that it is false, and that he is stating it instead of truth; he adopts, therefore, no false conclusion himself, but merely misleads another. 21. Cicero, when he threw a mist, as lie boasts, over the eyes of the Judges in the cause of Cluentius, was not himself deprived of sight; nor is a painter, when, by the power of his art, he makes us fancy that some objects stand out in a picture, and others recede, unaware that the objects are all on a flat surface.

22. But they allege also, that "all arts have a certain definite end to which they are directed; but that in oratory there is sometimes no end at all, and, at other times, the end which is professed is not attained." They speak falsely, however, in this respect likewise, for we have already shown, that oratory has an end, and have stated what that end is, an end which the true orator will always attain, for he will always *speak well*. 23. The objection might, perhaps, hold good against those who think that the end of oratory *is to persuade*, but my orator and his art, as defined by me, do not depend upon the result; lie indeed who speaks directs his efforts towards victory, but when he *has spoken well*, though he may not be victorious, he has attained the full end of his art. 24. So: pilot is desirous to gain the port with his vessel in safety, but if he is carried away from it by a tempest, he will not be the less a pilot, and will repeat the well-known saying, "May — but keep the helm right!"* 25. The physician makes the health of the patient his object, but if, through the violence of the disease, the intemperance of the sick person, or any other circumstance, he does not effect his purpose, yet, if he ha

* A proverbial expression, from 'the Greek *dpOdv rlv vavv* portion of a prayer to Neptune: Grant, O Neptune, that I may guide the ship right.' *Spalding* refers to Cie. ad Q. Fr. i. 2; Ep. ad Div. xi. 25; Sen. Epist. 85; Aristid. in Rhod. 542 ed. Jebb; Stoba:us. p. 577 Isidore, Orig., who gives from Ennius, *Ut clavum rectum teneat navimgue gubernem*; also Sen. Cons. ad M. Fil. c. 16; Erasmu Adag. iii. 1, 28.

done everything according to rule, lie has not lost sight of the object of medicine. So it is the object of an orator to speak well; for his *art*, as we shall soon show still more clearly, consists in the *act*, and not in the *result*. 26. That other allegation, which is frequently made, must accordingly be false also, that *an art knows when it has attained its end, but that oratory does not know*, for every speaker is aware when lie has spoken well.

They also charge oratory with having recourse to vicious means, which no true arts adopt, because it advances what is false, and endeavours to excite the passions. 27. But neither of those means is dishonourable, when it is used from a good motive, and, consequently, cannot be vicious. To tell a falsehood is sometimes allowed, even to a wise man ;* and the orator will be compelled to appeal to the feelings of the judges, if they cannot otherwise be induced to favour the right side. 28. Unenlightened men sit as judges,t who must, at times, be deceived, that they may not err in their decisions. If indeed judges were wise men : if assemblies of the people, and every sort of public council, consisted of wise men; if envy, favour, prejudice, and false witnesses, had no influence, there would be very little room for eloquence, which would be employed almost wholly to give pleasure. 29. But as the minds of the hearers waver, and truth is exposed to so many obstructions, the orator must use artifice in his efforts, and adopt such means as may promote his purpose, since he who has turned from the right way cannot be brought back to it but by another turning.

30. Some common sarcasms against oratory are drawn from the charge, that orators speak on both sides of a question ; hence the remarks, that " *no art contradicts itself, but that oratory contradicts itself;*" that " *no art destroys what it has itself done,* but that this is the case with what oratory does ;" that " *it teaches either what we ought to say, or what we ought not to say,* and that, in the one case, it cannot be an art, because it teaches what is not to be said, and, in the other, it cannot be an art, because, when it has taught what is to be said, it teaches also what is directly opposed to it." 31. All

^a Cie. Off. ii. 14, 16, 17.

^t The reader will remember that the *judices* of the Romans were similar to our jurymen, but more numerous. See Adam's Roman antiquities, or Smith's Diction. of Gr. and Row. Ant.

these charges, it is evident, are applicable only to that species of oratory which is repudiated by a good man and by virtue herself ; since, where the cause is unjust, there true oratory has no place, so that it can hardly happen, even in the most extraordinary case, that a real orator, that is, a good man, will speak on both sides. 32. Yet, since it may happen, in the course of things, th'at just causes may, at times, lead two wise men to take different sides, (for the Stoics think that wise men may even contend with one another, if reason leads them to do so,*) I will make some reply to the objections, and in such a way that they shall be proved to be advanced groundlessly, and directed only against such as allow the name of orator to speakers of bad character. 33. For *oratory does not contradict itself* ; one cause is matched against another cause, but not oratory against itself. If two men, have been taught the same accomplishment, contend with one another, the accomplishment which they have been taught will not, on that account, be proved not to be an art ; for, if such were the case, there could be no art in arms, because gladiators, bred under the same master, are often matched together ; nor would there be any art in piloting a ship; because, in naval engagements, pilot is often opposed to pilot ; nor in generalship, because general contends with general. 34. Nor does oratory *destroy what it has done, for the orator does not overthrow the argument advanced by himself,* nor does oratory overthrow it, because, by those who think that the end of oratory is to persuade, as well as by the two wise men, whom, as I said before, some chance may have opposed to one. another, it is probability that is sought ; and if, of two things, one at length appears more probable than the other, the more probable is not opposed to that which previously appeared probable ; for as that which is more white ^{if} not adverse to that which is less white, nor that which is more sweet contrary to that which is less sweet, so neither is that which is more probable contrary to that which is less probable. 35. Nor does oratory ever *teach what we ought not to say,* OR

^{*} The Stoics were compelled to hold this opinion, for they said that to govern a state was the business of a wise man, and yet could not venture to affirm that a wise man was to be found in any particular State only. I cannot at this moment, however, find any passage among the ancient authors expressly to that effect. *Spalding.*

that which is contrary to what we ought to say, but that which we ought to say in whatever cause we may take in Band. 36. And truth, though generally, is not always to be defended ; the public good sometimes requires that a falsehood should be supported.*

In Cicero's second book *De Oratore*,^f are also advanced the following objections : *that art has place in things which are known, but that the pleading of an orator depends on opinion, not on knowledge, since he both addresses himself to those who do not know, and sometimes says what he himself does not know.* 37. One of these points, whether the judges have a knowledge of what is addressed to them, has nothing to do with the art of the orator; to the other, that *art has place in things which are known, I* must give some answer. Oratory is the art of speaking well, and the orator knows how to speak well. 38. But it is said, he does not know whether what he says is true ; neither do the philosophers, who say that fire, or water, or the four elements, or indivisible atoms, are the principles from which all things had their origin, + know that what they say is true ; nor do those who calculate the distances of the stars, and the magnitudes of the sun and the earth, yet every one of them calls his system an *art* ; but if their reasoning has such effect that they seem not to *imagine*, but, from the force of their demonstrations, to *know* what they assert, similar reasoning may have a similar effect in the case of the orator. 39. But, it is further urged, he does not know whether the cause which he advocates has truth on its side ; nor, I answer, does the physician know whether the patient, who says that he has the head-ache, really has it, yet he will treat him on the assumption that his assertion is true, and medicine will surely be allowed to be an art. Need I aid, that oratory does not always purpose to say what is true, but does always purpose to say what is like truth ? but the orator must know whether what he says is like truth or not. 40. Those who are unfavourable to oratory add, that pleaders often defend, in certain causes, that which they have assailed in others ; but this is the fault, not of the art, but of the person.

* Compare c. 7, sect. 27, and sect. 27-29 of this chapter. f C. 7. The words are put into the mouth of Antonia.

§ See the first book of Lucretius.

I Or science, as we should now term it.

These are the principal charges that are brought against oratory. There are others of less moment, but drawn from the same sources.

41. But that it is an *art*, may be proved in a very few words ; for whether, as Cleuthes maintained, *an art* is a *power working its effects by a course*, that is *by method*, no man will doubt that there is a certain course and method in oratory ; or whether that definition, approved by almost every body, that *an art consists of perceptions* consenting and co-operating to some end useful to life*, be adopted also by us, we have already shown that everything to which this definition applies is to be found in oratory. 42. Need I show that it depends on understanding and practice, like other arts ? if logic be an art, as is generally admitted, oratory must certainly be an art, as it differs from logic rather in *species* than in *genus*. Nor must we omit to observe that in whatever pursuit one man may act according to a method, and another without regard to that method, that pursuit is all art ; and that ill whatever pursuit he who has learned succeeds better than he who has not learned, that pursuit is an art.

43. But, in the pursuit of oratory, not only will the learned excel the unlearned, but the more learned will excel the less learned ; otherwise there would not be so many rules in it, or so many great men to teach it. This ought to be acknowledged by every one, and especially by me, who allow the attainment of oratory only to the man of virtue.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Arts or sciences are of three kinds : 1. *liberal*, 2. *practical*, 3. *mechanical*.
e. 2P takes e rhetoric of the nature arts of other practical 3-5

1. BUT as some arts consist merely in an insight into things that is, knowledge of them, and judgment concerning them such as *astronomy*, which requires no act, but is confined to a mere understanding of the matters that form the subject.

* *Perceptionum*.] From the Greek *παραίτις*, signifying "thoroughly comprehended and understood."

of it (a sort of art which is called *AEag?lrrtxn*, "theoretic"*); other's-in action, the object of which lies in the act, and is fulfilled in it, leaving nothing produced from it (a sort of art which is called *rgazrixn*, "practic"), as *dancing*; 2. others in production, which attain their end in the execution of the work which is submitted to the eye (a sort which we call *rotmrxn*, "productive"), as *painting*, we may pretty safely determine that *oratory* consists in act, for it accomplishes in the act all that it has to do. Such indeed has been the judgment pronounced upon it by every one.

3. To me, however, it appears to partake greatly of the other sort of arts; for the subject of it may sometimes be restricted to contemplation; since there will be oratory in an orator even though he be silent; and if, either designedly, or from being disabled by any accident, he has ceased to plead, he will not cease to be an orator, more than a physician who has left *off praotice* ceases to a physician. 4. There is some enjoyment, and perhaps the greatest of all enjoyments, in retired meditation; and the pleasure derived from knowledge is pure when it is withdrawn from action, that is, from toil, and enjoys the calm contemplation of itself. 5. But oratory will also effect something similar to a productive art in written speeches and historical compositions, a kind of writings which we justly consider as allied to oratory. Yet if it must be classed as one of the three sorts of arts which I have mentioned, let it, as its performance consists chiefly in the mere act, and as it is most frequently exhibited *in act*, be called an *active*, or a *practical* art, for the one term is of the same signification as the other.

CHAPTER XIX.

Nature and art; nature contributes more to oratory, in students of moderate ability, than art; in those of greater talent, art is of more avail; an example.

1. I AM aware that it is also a question whether *nature or learning* contributes most to oratory. This inquiry, however,

* Such *artes* we call "sciences." The term *art* we distinguish from science by applying it only to that which produces something, *aurc* nreitit("Aurc.

has no concern with the subject of my work; for a perfect orator can be formed only with the aid of both; but ! think it of great importance how far we consider that there is a question * on the point. 2. If you suppose either to be independent of the other, nature will be able to do much without learning, but learning will be of no avail without the assistance of nature. But if they be united in equal parts, I shall be inclined to think that, when both are but moderate, the influence of nature is nevertheless the greater; but finished orators, I consider, owe more to learning than to nature. Thus the best husbandman cannot improve soil of no fertility, while from fertile ground something good will be produced even without the aid of the husbandman; yet if the husbandman bestows his labour on rich land, he will produce more effect than the goodness of the soil of itself. 3. Had Praxiteles attempted to hew a statue out of a millstone, I should have preferred to it an unhewn block of Parian marble; but if that statuary had fashioned the marble, more value would have accrued **to it** from his workmanship than was in the marble itself. In a word, nature is the material for learning; the one forms, and the other is formed. Art can do nothing without material; material has its value even independent of art; but perfection of art is of more consequence than perfection of material.

CHAPTER XX.

Whether rhetoric be *a virtue*, as some call it, § 1-4. Proofs of this, according to the philosophers, 3-7. Other proofs, 8-10.

1. IT is a question of a higher nature, whether oratory is to be regarded as one of those *indifferent* arts, which deserve neither praise nor blame in themselves, but become **useful or**

* *Quam-quaestionem.* This is obscurely expressed, says Spalding; but *quam* is equivalent to *qualem, quam late comprehensam.*

t The lover of art will hardly agree with Quintilian. *Spalding.* But, as Rollin observes, nothing could have been **less** suitable for sculpture than the stone used for millstones; and Quintilian might suppose that it would have been impossible, even for a Praxiteles, to have produced even a tolerable statue from it.

otherwise according to the characters of those who practise them ; or whether it is, as many of the philosophers are of opinion, a positive *virtue*.*

2. 'The way, indeed, in which many have proceeded and still proceed in the practice of speaking, I consider either as *no art, & Texvia*, as it is called, (for I see numbers rushing to speak without rule or learning, just as impudence or hunger has prompted them,) or as it were a *bad art*, which we term *xaxorexvia* ; for I imagine that there have been many who have exerted, and that there are some who still exert, their talent in speaking to the injury of mankind. 3. There is also a kind of *laaTa, oTexvks*, a vain imitation of art, which indeed has in itself neither good nor evil, but a mere frivolous exercise of skill, such as that of the man who sent grains of vetches, shot from a distance in succession, and without missing, through a needle, and whom Alexander, after witnessing his dexterity, is said to have presented with a bushel of vetches ; which was indeed a most suitable reward for his performance.t

4. To him I compare those who spend their time, with great study and labour, in the composition of declamations, which they strive to make as unlike as possible to anything that happens in real life.

But that oratory which I endeavour to teach, of which I conceive the idea in my mind, which is attainable only by a good man, and which alone is true oratory, must be regarded as *a virtue*.

• See note on c. 15, sect. 20. " *Virtues* are distinguished by Aristotle into two kinds, the *intellectual*, which are exerted in the discovery of truth and the accomplishment of our objects, under which head oratory may be included, as it is an art ; and the *moral*, which influence the will, actions, and conduct, under which head Quintilian shows that oratory may also be ranked as a virtue. *Turnebus*.

t It has been a question what sort of performance we should conceive this man's to have been. Naudœus, or Naudd, in his *Sytagma de Studio Liberali*, cited by Bayle, Art. Macedonia, note S, says that the man put a pea in his mouth, and, blowing it out, made it stick upon the point of the needle. This interpretation is adopted by Bayle, and by Spalding ; by Bayle with the utmost confidence, and by Spalding with some hesitation, for he admits that the verb *inscrere* is hardly applicable to the fixing of peas on the point of a needle. For my part, I consider that the expression *inserere in acum* wholly forbids us to understand anything else than that the peas were driven through the needle's eye. We may suppose it to have been a peculiar needle, with a large eye, made for the purpose. How the peas were impelled, Quintilian leaves us to conjecture.

5. This is an opinion which the philosophers support by many subtle arguments, but which appears to me to be more clearly established by the simpler mode of proof which follows, and which is peculiarly my own. What is said by the philosophers is this : If it is a quality of virtue to be consistent with itself as to what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, (that quality, namely, which is called *prudence*,) the same quality will have its office as to what ought to be said or not to be said. 6. And if there are virtues, for the generation of which, even before we receive any instruction, certain principles and seeds are given us by nature,* (as for that of justice, of which some notion is manifested even in the most ignorant and the most barbarous,) it is evident that we are so formed originally as to be able to speak for ourselves, though not indeed perfectly, yet in such a manner as to show that certain seeds of the faculty of eloquence are in us. 7. But in those arts which have no connexion with virtue, there is not the same nature.t As there are two kinds of speech, therefore, the *continuous*, which is called *oratory*, and the *concise*, which is termed *logic*, (which Zeno thought so nearly connected that he compared the one to a clenched fist, and the other to an open hand,) if the art of disputation t be a virtue, there will be no doubt of the virtue of that which is of so much more noble and expansive a nature.

† But I wish the reader to understand this more fully and plainly from what is done by oratory ; for how will an orator succeed in *eulogy*, unless he has a clear knowledge of what is honourable and what is disgraceful ? Or in *persuasion*, unless he understands what is advantageous ? Or in *judicial pleadings*, unless he has a knowledge of justice ? Does not oratory also demand fortitude, as the orator has often to speak in opposition to the turbulent threats of the populace, often with perilous defiance of powerful individuals, and sometimes, as on the trial of Milo,

* The Stoics and Academics said that the seeds of virtues were innate in us, and that, if we would but suffer them to grow, they would secure us a happy life. *Turnebus*.

t I wish that he had given an illustration of this position.

[*Ars disputatrix*.] That is, dialectics or logic. If mere dry logic be a virtue, how much *moss* will rich and forcible eloquence be a virtue I

amidst surrounding weapons of soldiers ? So that if oratory be not a virtue, it cannot be perfect.*

9. If, moreover, there is a sort of virtue in every species of animals, in which it excels the rest, or the greater number, of other animals, as force in the lion, and swiftness in the horse, and it is certain that man excels other animals in reason and speech, why should we not consider that the distinctive virtue of man lies as much in eloquence as in reason ? Crassus in Cicero justly makes an assertion to this effect - For eloquence," says he, " is one of the most eminent virtues;" and Cicero himself, in his own character, both in his epistles to Brutus,+ and in many other passages of his writings,§ calls eloquence a virtue.

10. But, it may be alleged, a vicious man will sometimes produce an exordium, a statement of facts, and a series of arguments, in such a way that nothing shall be desired in them. So, we may answer, a robber will fight with great bravery, yet fortitude will still be a virtue ; and a dishonest slave will bear torments without a groan, yet endurance of pain will still merit its praise. Many other things of the same nature occur, but from different principles of action. Let what I have said, therefore, as to eloquence being a virtue, be sufficient, for of its usefulness I have treated above.

* On the contrary, if oratory be *perfect oratory*, it must necessarily be a *virtue*.

t De Orat. iii. 14.

This passage the learned have in vain sought in the Epistles to Brutus ; nor is their disappointment at all wonderful, if the ingenious and learned Tunstall is right, in his Epistle to Middleton, in condemning those epistles as spurious. His condemnation has an authoritative supporter in Ruhnken, ad Vell. Pat. ii. 12. *Spalding*. Of the spuriousness of the epistles to Brutus, as they are called, few, surely, will now be found to doubt. Such is their poverty of matter, and affectation of style, that it is wonderful that Middleton should ever have thought them comparable to the genuine letters of Cicero.

Partit. Orat. c. 23, *init.* ; Acad. Q. i. 2.

CHAPTER XXI.

Of opinions as to the subject of rhetoric, § 1-4. That of Quintilian, which agrees with those of Plato and Cicero, 5, 6. Objections to it noticed, 7-11. No dispute between rhetoric and philosophy about their respective subjects, 12, 13. The orator not obliged to know everything, 14, 15. He will often speak better on arts than the artists themselves, 16-19. The opinion of Quintilian supported by those of other authors, 20--23.

1. As to the *material* of oratory, some have said that it is *speech*; an opinion which Gorgias in Plato* is represented as holding. If this be understood in such a way that a discourse, composed on any subject, is to be termed a *speech*, it is not the material, but the work ; as the statue is the work of a statuary ; for speeches, like statues, are produced by art. But *if by* this term we understand mere words, words are of no effect without matter. 2. Some have said that the material of oratory is *persuasive arguments*; which indeed are part of its business, and are the produce of art, but require material for their composition. Others say that its material is *questions of civil administration* ; an opinion which is wrong, not as to the quality of the matter, but in the restriction attached ; for such questions are the subject of oratory, but not the only subject. 3. Some, as oratory is a *virtue*, say that the subject of it is *the whole of human life*. Others, as no part of human life is affected by every virtue, but most virtues are concerned only with particular portions of life, (as *justice, fortitude, temperance*, are regarded as confined to their proper duties and their own limits,) say that oratory is to be restricted to one special part, and assign to it the *pragmatic* department of ethics, or *that which relates to the transactions of civil life*.^t

4. For my part, I consider, and not without authorities to support me, that the material of oratory is *everything that may come before an orator for discussion*. For Socrates in Plato seems to say to Gorgias * that *the matter of oratory is*

* Plato Gorg. p. 449 E.

^t *Eique locum in ethice negotialem assignant, id est, irpayparis6v. l* By *pare negotialis* he means that which relates to law proceedings, civil and judicial causes. *Turnebus*. Or that which relates to the acts of civil life, or the conduct of affairs in general. *Capperonier*.

Gorg. p. 449-454.

vet in words but in things. In the Phaedrus* he plainly shows that oratory has place, not only in judicial proceedings and political deliberations, but also in private and domestic matters. Hence it is manifest that this was the opinion of Plato, himself.† 5. Cicero, too, in one passage,* calls the material of oratory the topics which are submitted to it for discussion, but supposes that particular topics only are submitted to it. But in another passage § he gives his opinion that an orator has to speak upon all subjects, expressing himself in the following words : " The art of the orator, however, and his very profession of speaking well, seems to undertake and promise that he will speak elegantly and copiously on whatever subject may be proposed to him." 6. In a third passage,|| also, he says : " But by an orator, whatever occurs in human life (since it is on human life that an orator's attention is to be fixed, as the matter that comes under his consideration) ought to have been examined, heard of, read, discussed, handled, and managed."

7. But this *material* of oratory, as we define it, that is, the subjects that come before it, some have at one time stigmatized as indefinite,¶ at another as not belonging to oratory, and have called it, as thus characterised, an *ars circumcurrens*, an infinitely discursive art, as discoursing on any kind of subject. 8. With such as make these observations I have no great quarrel ; for they allow that oratory speaks on all matters, though they deny that it has any peculiar *material*, because its material is manifold. 9. But though the material be manifold, it is not infinite ; and other arts, of less consideration, deal with manifold material, as *architecture*, for instance, for it has to do with everything that is of use for building ; and the art of *engraving*, which works with gold, silver, brass, and iron. As to *sculpture*, it extends itself, besides the metals which I have just named, to wood, ivory, marble, glass, and jewels. 10. Nor will a topic cease to belong to the orator because the professor of another art may treat of it ; for if I should ask what is the material of

P. 261 A.

† As being put into the mouth of Socrates.

§ De Orat. i. 15; Inv. i. 4.

|| De Orat. i. 6.

¶ De Orat. iii. 14.

[*hifinitam.*] Indefinite, indeterminate; because it represents oratory as devoted to no particular subject, but as ready to **exert itself** an any tonic on which men can speak. *Cupperonicr*

the statuary, the answer will be "brass;" or if I should ask what is the material of the founder of vases, that is the worker in the art which the Greeks call *xa) `zeur:x'*; the reply would also be "brass;" though vases differ very much from statues.

11. Nor ought medicine to lose the name of an art, because anointing and exercise are common to it with the p thestra, or because a knowledge of the quality of meats is common to it with cookery.

12. As to the objection which some make, that it is the business of *philosophy* to discourse of what is good, useful, and just, it snakes nothing against me; for when they say a philosopher, they mean a good man ; and why then should I be surprised that an orator, whom I consider to be also a good man, should discourse upon the same subjects? 13. especially when I have shown, in the preceding book,* that philosophers have taken possession of this province because it was abandoned by the orators, a province which had always belonged to oratory, so that the philosophers are rather trespassing upon our ground. Since it is the business of logic, too, to discuss whatever comes before it, and logic is uncontinuous oratory, why may not the business of continuous oratory be thought the same ?

14. It is a remark constantly made by some, that *an orator must be skilled in all arts if he is to speak upon all subjects.* I might reply to this in the words of Cicero,† in whom I find this passage : " In my opinion no man can become a thoroughly accomplished orator, unless he shall have attained a knowledge of every subject of importance, and of all the liberal arts;" but for my argument it is sufficient that an orator be acquainted with the subject on which he has to speak. 15. He has not a knowledge of all causes, and yet he ought to be able to speak upon all. On what causes, then, will he speak ? on such as he has learned. The same will be the case also with regard to the arts and sciences ; those on which he shall have to speak he will study for the occasion, and on those which he has studied he will speak.

16. What then, it may be said, will not a builder speak of building, or a musician of music, better than an orator? As surely he will speak better, if the orator does not know what is the subject of inquiry in the case before him, with regard to

* Procem. sect. 10 *aegy.*

† De Orat. i. 6.

matters connected with those sciences. An ignorant and illiterate person, appearing before a court, will plead his own cause better than an orator who does not know what the subject of dispute is ; but an orator will express what he has learned from the builder, or the musician, or from his client, better than the person who has instructed him. 17. But the *builder will* speak well on *building*, or the *musician on music*, if any point in those arts shall require to be established by his opinion ; he will not be an orator, but he will perform his part like an orator, as when an unprofessional person binds up a wound, he *will* not be a surgeon, yet he will act as a surgeon.

18. Do subjects of this kind never come to be mentioned in *panegyric*, or *deliberative*, or *judicial* oratory? When it was under deliiberation, whether a harbour should be constructed at Ostia,* were not orators called to deliver opinions on the subject ? yet what was wanted was the professional knowledge of the architect. 19. Does not the orator enter on the question, whether discolorations and tumours of the body are symptoms of ill health or of poison ?t yet such inquiries belong to the profession of medicine ? Will an orator never have to speak of dimensions and numbers? yet we may say that such matters belong to mathematics ; for my part, I believe that any subject whatever may, by some chance, come under the cognizance of the orator. If a matter does not come under his cognizance, he will have no concern with it.

20. Thus I have justly said, that *the material of oratory is everything that is brought under its notice for discussion*, an assertion which even our daily conversation supports, for whenever we have any subject on which to speak, we often signify by some prefatory remark, that the matter is laid before us. 21. So much was Gorgias ^t of opinion that an orator must speak of everything, that he allowed himself to be questioned by the people ⁱⁱⁱ his lecture-room, upon any subject on which any one of them chose to interrogate him. Hermagoras also, by saying, that " the matter of oratory lies

* See Suet. Claud. c. 20, where it is stated that the work had often been contemplated by Julius Caesar, but deferred from time to time on account of its difficulty.

t Cicero touches on this medical part, so to speak, of eloquence in his speech for Cluentius, c. 10. *Spalding*.

+ Plato Gorg. p. 447 C. In reference to this passage of Plato, see Cic. de Orat. iii. 32; i 22; de Inv. i. 5 ; do Fin. ii. 1.

in the cause and the questions * connected with it," comprehends under it every subject that can possibly come before it for discussion. 22. If indeed he supposed that *the questions* do not belong to oratory, he is of a different opinion from me ; but if they do belong to oratory, I am supported by his authority, for there is no subject that may not form part of a cause or the questions connected with it. 23. Aristotle,t too, by making three kinds of oratory, the *judicial*, the *deliberative*, and the *demonstrative*, has put almost everything into the hands of the orator, for there is no subject that may not enter into one of the three kinds.

24. An inquiry has been also started, though by a very few writers, concerning the *instrument* of oratory. The instrument *I call that without which material cannot be fashioned and adapted to the object which we wish to effect*. But I consider that it is not the art that requires the instrument, but the artificer. Professional knowledge needs no tool, as it may be complete though it produces nothing, but the artist must have his tool, as the engraver his graving-instrument, and the painter his pencils. I shall therefore reserve the consideration of this point for that part of my work in which I intend to speak of *the orator*. \$

See iii. 5, 16 ; iii. 6, 2. The questions meant are *general questions*, as, " Whether the senses may be trusted," "Whether an old man ought to marry," and the like, which Cicero excludes from the department of the orator, de Invent. i. 6.

+ Rhet. i. 3. 3 ; Cic. de Invent. i. G.

\$ B. xii. c. E.