

that **no** master, from being too much an admirer of antiquity, should allow them to harden, as it were, in the reading of the Gracchi, Cato,^o and other like authors ; for they would thus become uncouth and dry ; since they cannot, as yet, understand their force of thought, and content with adopting their style, which, at the time it was written, was doubtless excellent, but is quite unsuitable to our day, they will appear to themselves to resemble those eminent men. 22. The other point, which is the opposite of the former, is, lest, being captivated with the flowers of modern affectation, they should be so seduced by a corrupt kind of pleasure, as to love that luscious manner of writing which is the more agreeable to the minds of youth in proportion as it has more affinity with them. 23. When their taste is formed, however, and out of danger of being corrupted, I should recommend them to read not only the ancients, (from whom if a solid and manly force of thought be adopted, while the rust of a rude age is cleared off, our present style will receive additional grace,) but also the writers of the present day, in whom there is much merit. 24. For nature has not condemned us to stupidity, but we ourselves have changed our mode of speaking, and have indulged our fancies more than we ought ; and thus the ancients did not excel us so much in genius as in severity of manner. It will be possible, therefore, to select from the moderns many qualities for imitation, but care must be taken that *they* be not contaminated with other qualities with which they are mixed. Yet that there have been recently, and are now, many writers whom we may imitate entirely, I would not only allow, (for why should I not?) but even affirm. 26. But who they are it is not for *everybody* to decide. We may even err with greater safety in regard to the ancients ; and I would therefore defer the reading of the moderns, that imitation may not go before judgment.

* The speeches of the Gracchi are lost. Of the many books which Crato wrote none has survived but his treatise on agriculture.

CHAPTER VI.

In composition, the pupil should have but moderate assistance, not too much or too little.

1. THERE has been also a diversity of practice among teachers in the following respect. Some of them, not confining themselves to giving directions as to the division of any subject which they assigned their pupils for declamation, developed it more fully by speaking on it themselves, and amplified it not only with proofs but with appeals to the feelings. 2. Others, giving merely the first outlines, exhibited after the declamations were composed, on whatever points each pupil had omitted, and polished some passages with no less care than they would have used if they had themselves been rising to speak in public.

Both methods are beneficial ; and, therefore, for my own part, I give no distinction to either of them above the other ; but, if it should be necessary to follow only one of the two, it will be of greater service to point out the right way at first, than to recall those who have gone astray from their errors ; 3. first, because to the subsequent emendation they merely listen, but the preliminary division they carry to their meditation and their composition ; and, secondly, because they more willingly attend to one who gives directions than to one who finds faults. Whatever pupils, too, are of a high spirit,* are apt, especially in the Present state of manners, to be angry at admonition, and offer silent resistance to it. 4. Not that faults are therefore to be less openly corrected ; for regard is to be had to the other pupils, who will think that whatever the master has not amended is right. But both methods should be united, and used as occasion may require. To beginners should be given matter designed, as it were, beforehand, in proportion to the abilities of each. But when they shall appear to have formed themselves sufficiently on their model.

* *Vivaciores.*] That is, says Spalding, *alacriores, animotiores*, supporting his opinion by several apt quotations. Capperonier unhappily thought that the word meant *cetate proveciores*.

t Præormata.] A metaphorical expression borrowed from architects, who sketch out their work either by *sciographia, ichnographia*, or *liwgraphia*. Turnebus.

a few brief directions may be given them, following which they may advance by their own strength without any support. 6.' It is proper that they should sometimes be left to themselves, lest, from the bad habit of being always led by the efforts of others, they should lose all capacity of attempting and producing anything for themselves. But when they seem to judge pretty accurately of what ought to be said, the labour of the teacher is almost at an end ; though, should they still commit errors, they must be again put under a guide. 7. Something of this kind we see birds practise, which divide food, collected in their beaks, among their tender and helpless young ones ; but, when they seem sufficiently grown, teach them, by degrees, to venture out of the nest, and flutter round their place of abode, themselves leading the way ; and at last leave their strength, when properly tried, to the open sky and their own self-confidence.*

* Valerius Flaccus, vii. 375

Qualis adhuc teneros supremum pallida foetus
Mater ab excelso produxit in aera nido,
Hortaturque sequi, brevibusque insurgere pennis ;
Illos ccerulei primus ferit horror Olympi ;
Jamque redire rogant, adsuetaque quwritur arbor.

As when the anxious dam her tender young
Leads from their lofty nest to loftier skies,
Bidding them follow her, and rise upborne
On half-grown wings ; the blue expanse, first tried,
Strikes them with dread ; they, fluttering, chirp for leave
Back to return, and seek th' accustom'd tree.

Of which lines the germ, as Burmann remarks, is found in Ovid, Met. viii. 213

Velut ales ab alto
Quae teneram prolem produxit in aera nido,
Hortaturque sequi.

The simile is very happily adopted by Goldsmith

And as a bird each fond endearment tries,
To lure her new-fledged offspring to the skins.

CHAPTER VII.

Pupils should not always declaim their own compositions, but **soma** times passages from eminent writers,

1. ONE change, I think, should certainly be made in what is customary with regard to the age of which we are speaking. Pupils should not be obliged to learn by heart what they have composed, and to repeat it, as is usual, on a certain day, a task which it is fathers that principally exact, thinking that their children then only study when they repeat frequent declamations ; whereas proficiency depends chiefly on the diligent cultivation of style. 2. For though I would wish boys to compose, and to spend much time in that employment, yet, as to learning by heart, I would rather recommend for that purpose select passages from orations or histories, or any other sort of writings deserving of such attention. 3. The memory will thus be more efficiently exercised in mastering what is another's than what is their own ; and those who shall have been practised in this more difficult kind of labour, will fix in their minds, without trouble, what they themselves have composed, as being more familiar* to them ; they will also accustom themselves to the best compositions, and they will always have in their memory something which they may imitate, and will, even without being aware, re-produce that fashion of style which they have deeply impressed upon their minds. 4. They will have at command, moreover, an abundance of the best words, phrases, and figures, not sought for the occasion, but offering themselves spontaneously, as it were, from a store treasured within them. To this is added the power of quoting the happy expressions of any author, which is agreeable in common conversation, and useful in pleading ; for phrases which are not coined for the sake of the cause in hand have the greater weight, and often gain us more applause than if they were our own.

5. Yet pupils should sometimes be permitted to recite what they themselves have written, that they may reap the full reward of their labour from that kind of applause which is most

* Spalding retains *familiarius* in his text, but has no doubt that *famdiaria*, given by Obrecht, is the true reading.

desired.* This permission will most properly be granted when a they have produced something more polished than ordinary, that they may thus be presented with some return for their study, and rejoice that they have deserved to recite their composition.

CHAPTER VIII.

Variety of talent and disposition in pupils requires variety of treatment, § 1-5. How far an inclination for any particular hue of study should be encouraged and cultivated, 6-15.

1. IT is generally, and not without reason, regarded as an excellent quality in a master to observe accurately the differences of ability in those whom he has undertaken to instruct, and to ascertain in what direction the nature of each particularly inclines him ; for there is in talent an incredible variety ; nor are the forms of the mind fewer than those of the body. 2. This may be understood even from orators themselves, who differ so much from each other in their style of speaking, that no one is like another, though most of them have set themselves to imitate those whom they admired. 3. It has also been thought advantageous by most teachers to instruct each pupil in such a manner as to cherish by learning the good qualities inherited from nature, so that the powers may be assisted in their progress towards the object to which they chiefly direct themselves. As a master of palaestic exercises, when he enters a gymnasium full of *boys*, is able, after trying their strength and comprehension in every possible way, to decide for what kind of exercise each ought to be trained ; 4. so a teacher } of eloquence, they say, when he has clearly observed which boy's genius delights most in a concise and

* That is, the applause of their fellow students. If they merely wrote, and did not recite, they would gain, as Spalding observes, the commendation of the master only.

} *lice p̄ceptorem.*] The accusative depends on something understood, which must be sought in the preceding *utile visum est, aiunt*, or something similar, being supplied. That Quintilian is repeating the opinion of others is shown by the subjunctives *cvalescat, pomit, faciat*. Spalding.

polished manner of speaking, and which in a spirited, or grave, or smooth, or rough, or brilliant, or elegant tone, will so accommodate his instructions to each, that he will be advanced in that department in which he shows most ability ; 5. because nature attains far greater power when seconded by culture ; and he that is led contrary to nature, cannot make due progress in the studies for which he is unfit, and makes those talents, for the exercise of which he seemed born, weaker by neglecting to cultivate them.

6. This opinion seems to me (for to him that follows reason there is free exercise of judgment even in opposition to received persuasions) just only in part. To distinguish peculiarities of talent is absolutely necessary ; and to make choice of particular studies to suit them, is what no man would discountenance. 7. For one youth will be fitter for the study of history than another ; one will, be qualified for writing poetry, another for the study of law, and some perhaps fit only to be sent into the fields. The teacher of rhetoric will decide in accordance with these peculiarities, just as the master of the *palcestra* will make one of his pupils a runner, another a boxer, another a wrestler, or fit him for any other of the exercises that are practised at the sacred games.

8. But he who is destined for public speaking must strive to excel, not merely in one accomplishment, but in all the accomplishments that are requisite for that art, even though some of them may seem too difficult for him when he is learning them ; for instruction would be altogether superfluous if the natural state of the mind were sufficient. 9. If a pupil that is vitiated in taste, and turgid in his style, as many are, is put under our care, shall we allow him to go on in his own way ? Him that is dry and jejune in his manner, shall we not nourish, and, as it were, clothe ? For if it be necessary to prune something away from certain pupils, why should it not be allowable to add something to others ? 10. Yet I would not fight against nature ; for I do not think that any good quality, which is innate, should be detracted, but that whatever is inactive or deficient should be invigorated or supplied. Was that famous teacher Isocrates, whose writings are not stronger proofs that he spoke well, than his scholars that he taught well, inclined, when he formed such an opinion of Ephorus and Theopompus as to say that *the one wanted the rein and the*

*,then the spur,"** to think that the slowness in the duller, and the ardour in the more impetuous, were to be fostered by education? On the contrary, he thought that the qualities of each ought to be mixed with those of the other. 12. We must so far accommodate ourselves, however, to feeble intellects, that they may be trained only to that to which nature invites them; for thus they will do with more success the only thing which they can do. But if richer material fall into our hands, from which we justly conceive hopes of a true orator, { no rhetorical excellence must be left unstudied. 13. For though such a genius be more inclined, as indeed it must be, to the exercise of certain powers, yet it will not be averse to that of others, and will render them, by study, equal to those in which it naturally excelled; just as the skilful trainer in bodily exercise, (that I may adhere to my former illustration,) will not, if he undertakes to form a pancratiast, teach him to strike with his fist or his heel only, or instruct him merely in wrestling, or only in certain artifices of wrestling, but will practise him in everything pertaining to the pancratiastic art.

There may perhaps be some pupil unequal to some of these exercises. He must then apply chiefly to that in which he can succeed. 14. For two things are especially to be avoided; one, to attempt what cannot be accomplished; and the other, to divert a pupil from what he does well to something else for which he is less qualified. But if he be capable of instruction, the tutor, like Nicostratus whom we, when young, knew at an advanced age, will bring to bear upon him every art of instruction alike, and render him invincible, as Nicostratus was in wrestling and boxing, § for success in both of which con-

* See Cie. de Orat. iii. 9; Brut. c. 56; also Quintil. x. 1, 74. Consult also Ruhnken, *Historia Oratorum*, p. 87. *Spalding*.

t Quum-arbitraretur.] I have taken a little liberty with this *quum.*, on account of another preceding it. The sentence, if rendered with exact literalness, would hardly please the English reader. The scholar will easily see the sense.

§ *In quod merito ad apem oratoris simus aggressi.*] "On which we have justly risen to the hope of an orator." *Aggredi ad spem,*" says *Spalding*, "for *se toilers in spem*; and *in quod* for *quod oblata, cuju occasione.*"

§ A pancratiast and wrestler. See Pausan. v. 21. The saying, *iyw Arotijaw Travra Kara N«6arparov*, which occurs twice in *Suidas*, *in iyw* and *Nuc aparos*, is said to refer to a play of that name.

tests he was crowned on the same day. 15. How much more must such training, indeed, be pursued by the teacher of the future orator! For it is not enough that he should speak concisely, or artfully, or vehemently, any more than for a singing master to excel in acute, or middle, or grave tones only, or even in particular subdivisions of them: since eloquence is, like a harp, not perfect, unless, with all its strings stretched, it be in unison from the highest to the lowest note.

CHAPTER IX.

Pupil should regard their tutors as intellectual parents.

1. HAVING spoken thus fully concerning the duties of teachers, I give pupils, for the present, only this one admonition, that they are to love their tutors not less than their studies, and to regard them as parents, not indeed of their bodies, but of their minds. 2. Such affection contributes greatly to improvement, for pupils, under its influence, will not only listen with pleasure, but will believe what is taught them, and will desire to resemble their instructors. They will come together, in assembling for school, with pleasure and cheerfulness; they will not be angry when corrected, and will be delighted when praised; and they will strive, by their devotion to study, to become as dear as possible to the master. 3. For as it is the duty of preceptors to teach, so it is that of pupils to show themselves teachable; neither of these duties, else, will be of avail without the other. And as the generation of man is effected by both parents, and as you will in vain scatter seed, unless the furrowed ground, previously softened, cherish it, so neither can eloquence come to its growth unless by mutual agreement between him who communicates and him who receives.

CHAPTER X.

Remarks on declamations, § 1, 2. Injudiciousness in the choice of subjects has been an obstruction to improvement in eloquence, 3-5. On what sort of subjects pupils may be permitted to declaim, 6-8. What alterations should be made in the common practice, 9-15.

1. WHEN the pupil has been well instructed, and sufficiently exercised, in these preliminary studies, which are not in themselves inconsiderable, but members and portions, as it were, of higher branches of learning, the time will have nearly arrived for entering on deliberative and judicial subjects. But before I proceed to speak of those matters, I must say a few words on the art of declamation, which, though the most recently invented* of all exercises, is indeed by far the most useful. 2. For it comprehends within itself all those exercises of which I have been treating, and presents us with a very close resemblance to reality ; and it has been so much adopted, accordingly, that it is thought by many sufficient of itself to form oratory, since no excellence in continued speaking can be specified, which is not found in this prelude to speaking. 3. The practice however has so degenerated through the fault of the teachers, that the license and ignorance of declaimers have been among the chief causes that have corrupted eloquence. But of that which is good by nature we may surely make a good use. 4. Let therefore the subjects themselves, which shall be imagined, be as like as possible to truth ; and let declamations to the utmost extent that is practicable, imitate those pleading% for which they were introduced as a preparation. 5. For as to *magicians*, and the *pestilence*, and *oracles*,§ and *step-*

* See i. 4, 41, 42.

† *Meditation.*] That is *uXirq*, or *exercise*. Capperonier.

§ Such a subject as that of the tenth of the declamations ascribed to Quintilian, entitled *Sepulchru?n Incantatum*.

§ *Pestilentiam, et responsa.*] These two words appear to refer to the same subject, which is that of the 326th declamation of those called Quintilian's: A people suffering from pestilence sent a deputy to consult an oracle about a remedy ; the answer given him was that he must sacrifice his own son. On his return he communicated the oracle to his son, but concealed it from the public authorities, telling them that they had to perform certain sacred rites. When the rites were finished, the pestilence did not abate ; and the son then put himself to

mothers more cruel than those of tragedy, and other subjects more imaginary than these, we shall in vain seek them among *sponsions* and *interdicts*.* What, then, it may be said, shall we never suffer students to handle such topics as are above belief, and (to say the truth) poetical, so that they may expatiate and exult in their subject, and swell forth as it were into full body? 6. It would indeed be best not to suffer them ; but at least let not the subjects, if grand and turgid, appear also, to him who regards them with severe judgment, foolish and ridiculous ; so that, if we must grant the use of such topics, let the declaimer swell himself occasionally to the full, provided he understands that, as four-footed animals, when they have been blown with green fodder, are cured by losing blood, and thus return to food suited to maintain their strength, so must his turgidity § be diminished, and whatever corrupt humours he has contracted be discharged, if he wishes to be healthy and strong ; for otherwise his empty swelling will be hampered§ at the first attempt at any real pleading.

7. Those, assuredly, who think that the whole exercise of declaiming is altogether different from forensic pleading, do not see even the reason for which that exercise was instituted.

8. For, if it is no preparation for the forum, it is merely like theatrical ostentation, or insane raving. To what purpose is it to instruct a judge, who has no existence ? To state a case that all know to be fictitious? To bring proofs of a point on which no man will pronounce sentence ? This indeed is nothing more than trifling ; but how ridiculous is it to excite our feelings, and to work upon an audience with anger and sorrow, unless we are preparing ourselves by imitations of battle for serious contests and a regular field ? 9. Will there then be

death. After the pestilence had subsided, the father was accused of treason to the state. See also *Declamat*, 384, and the 19th and 43rd of those ascribed to Calpurnius Flaccus.

* Law terms; *sponsio* was when a litigant engaged to pay a certain sum of money if he lost the cause ; an *interdict* was when the praetor ordered or forbade anything to be done, chiefly in regard to property.

Tumebus.

† *Quasi in corpus cant.*] Compare c. 4, sect. 5.

‡ *Adipes*, fat.

§ *Deprehendetur.*] Not equivalent to *invenietur* or *agnoscetur*, but to *in aretum deferetur et cestuabit, se expedire nesciens*. See i. 1, 84. *fipaldiny*.

no difference, it may be asked, between the mode of speaking at the bar, and mere exercise in declamation ? I answer, that if we speak for the sake of improvement, there will be no difference. I wish, too, that it were made a part of the exercise to use names ; * that causes more complicated, and requiring longer pleadings, were invented ; that we were less afraid of words in daily use ; and that we were in the habit of mingling jests with our declamation ; all which points, however we may have been practised in the schools in other respects, find us novices at the bar.

10. But even if a declamation be composed merely for display, we ought surely to exert our voice in some degree to please the audience. For even in those oratorical compositions, which are doubtless based in some degree upon truth, but are adapted to please the multitude, (such as are the panegytics which we read, and all that *epideictic* kind of eloquence,) it is allowable to use great elegance, and not only to acknowledge the efforts of art, (which ought generally to be concealed in forensic pleadings,) but to display it to those who are called together for the purpose of witnessing it. 12. Declamation therefore, as it is an imitation of real pleadings and deliberations, ought closely to resemble reality, but, as it carries with it something of ostentation, to clothe itself in a certain elegance. 13. Such is the practice of actors, who do not pronounce exactly as we speak in common conversation, for such pronunciation would be devoid of art ; nor do they depart far from nature, as by such a fault imitation would be destroyed ; but they exalt the simplicity of familiar discourse with a certain scenic grace.

14. However some inconveniences will attend us from the nature of the subjects which we have imagined, especially as many particulars in them are left uncertain, which we settle as suits our purpose, as *age, fortune, children, parents, strength, laws, and manners of cities*; and other things of a similar kind. 15. Sometimes, too, we draw arguments from the very faults of the imaginary causes. But on each of these points

Which were not introduced in declamations ; for *paten, tyrannicida, abdicates, raptor* were used as general terms, rendering the whole performance less animated, and less like reality. In *suasorie orationes* persons were specified, but to them Quintilian seems to make no reference in these remarks. *Spalding.*

we shall speak in its proper place. For though the whole object of the work intended by us has regard to the formation of an orator, yet, lest students may think anything wanting, we shall not omit, in passing, whatever may occur that fairly relates to the teaching of the schools.

CHAPTER XI.

Some think instruction in oratory unnecessary, § 1, 2. Boasts and practices of the ignorant, 3-5. Sonic study only parts of their speeches ; want of connexion in their matter, 6, 7.

1. FROM this point, then, I am to enter upon that portion of the art with which those who have omitted the preceding portions usually commence. I see, however, that -some will oppose me at the very threshold ; men who think that eloquence has no need of rules of this kind, and who, satisfied with their own natural ability, and the common methods of teaching and exercise in the schools, even ridicule my diligence ; following the example of certain professors of great reputation. It was one of those characters, I believe, who, being asked what *a figure* and what *a thought* was, answered that "he did not know, but that, if it had any relation to his subject, it would be found in his declamation." 2. Another of them replied to a person who asked him " whether he was a follower of Theodorus or Apollodorus," " I am a prize-fighter."* Nor could he indeed have escaped an avowal of his ignorance with greater wit. But such men, as they have

* *Percontanti* Theodorus an Apollodoreus esset, Ego, *inquit*, *parmularius* sum.] Theodorus and Apollodorus were well-known rhetoricians, often mentioned by Quintilian, and leaders of parties, That *parmularius* signifies one who favoured the gladiators in the theatre and arena, called *Thraces* from their armour, has been shown by the commentators on Suet. Domit. c. 10. . . . The man to whom Quintilian alludes intimates that he knew whom to favour in the arena and the *circus*, but that for parties among rhetoricians he had no care. *Gesner.* "It is almost the same as if a person, upon being asked whether he were a Nominalist or a Realist, were to reply, ' I am a Carthusian, that is, I do not care for or do not know the names Nominalist and Realist.' Scheller's Lexicon, s.v. *partmularius*

attained eminent repute through the goodness of their natural powers, and have uttered many things even worthy of remembrance, have had very many imitators that resemble them in negligence, but very few that approach them in ability. 3. They make it their boast that they speak from impulse, and merely exert their natural powers ; and say that there is no need of proofs or arrangement in fictitious subjects, but only of grand thoughts, to hear which the auditory will be crowded, and of which the best are the offspring of venturesomeness. 4. In meditation, also, as they use no method, they either wait, often for some days,* looking at the ceiling for some great thought that may spontaneously present itself, or, exciting themselves with inarticulate sounds, as with a trumpet, they adapt the wildest gestures of body, not to the utterance, but to the excogitation of words.

5. Some, before they have conceived any thoughts, fix upon certain heads, under which something eloquent is to be introduced ; but, after modulating their words to themselves, aloud and for a long time, they desert their proposed arrangement, from despairing of the possibility of forming any connexion, and then turn to one train of ideas, and again to another, all equally common and hackneyed. 6. Those however who seem to have most method, do not bestow their efforts on fictitious causes, but on common topics, in which they do not direct their view to any certain object, but throw out detached thoughts as they occur to them. 7. Hence it happens that their speech, being unconnected and made up of different pieces, cannot hang together, but is like the notebooks of boys, in which they enter promiscuously whatever has been commended in the declamations of others. Yet they sometimes strike out fine sentiments and good thoughts (for so indeed they are accustomed to boast) ; but barbarians and slaves do the same ; and, if this be sufficient, there is no art at all in eloquence

* *Pluribus cape diebus.*] Galloeus and Gesner thought that these words, as absurdly hyperbolic, should be struck out of the text. Comp. xi. 3, 160 ; x. 4, 15.

CHAPTER XII.

Why the ignorant often seem to speak with more force; than the learned, § 1-3. They attack more boldly, and are less afraid of failure, 4, 5. But they cannot choose judiciously, or prove with effect, 6. Their thoughts sometimes striking, 7. Apparent disadvantages of learned polish, 8. Unlearned speakers often vigorous in delivery, 9, 10. Occasionally too much admired by teachers of oratory, 11, 12.

1. I MUST not forbear to acknowledge, however, that people in general adopt the notion that the unlearned appear to speak with more force than the learned. But this opinion has its origin chiefly in the mistake of those who judge erroneously, and who think that what has no art has the more energy ; just as if they should conceive it a greater proof of strength to break through a door than to open it, to rupture a knot than to untie it,-to drag an animal than to lead it. 2. By such persons a gladiator, who rushes to battle without any knowledge of arms, and a wrestler, who struggles with the whole force of his body to effect that which he has once attempted, is called so much the braver ; though the latter is often laid prostrate by his own strength, and the other, however violent his assault, is withstood by a gentle turn of his adversary's wrist.*

3. But there are some things concerning this point that very naturally deceive the unskilful ; for *division*, though it is of great consequence in pleadings, diminishes the appearance of strength ; what is rough is imagined more bulky than what is polished ; and objects when scattered are thought more numerous than when they are ranged in order.

4. There is also a certain affinity between particular excellences and-faults, in consequence of which a *railer* passes for a *free speaker*, a *rash* for a *bold* one, a *prolix* for a *copious* one. But an ignorant pleader rails too openly and too frequently, to the peril of the party whose cause lie has undertaken, and often to his own. 5. Yet this practice attracts the notice of people to him, because they readily listen to what they would not themselves utter.

Such a speaker, too, is far from avoiding that venturesome-

* *Illum, vehementis impetus, excipit adversarii moths artieulus.*] "*The flexible joint of the adversary withstands him [who is] of violent assault ;*" *vehementis impetus* being a genitive of quality.

ness which lies in mere expression,* and makes desperate efforts ; whence it may happen that he who is always seeking something extravagant, may sometimes find something great'; but it happens only seldom, and does not compensate for undoubted faults.

6. It is on this account that unlearned speakers seem sometimes to have greater copiousness of language, because they pour forth every thing ; while the learned use selection and moderation. Besides, unlearned pleaders seldom adhere to the object of proving what they have asserted ; by this means they avoid what appears to judges of bad taste the dryness of questions and arguments, and seek nothing else but matter in which they may please the ears of the court with senseless gratifications.

7. Their *fine sentiments* themselves, too, at which alone they aim, are more striking when all around them is poor and mean ; as lights are most brilliant, not amidst shades as Cicero says,t but amidst utter darkness. Let such speakers therefore be called as ingenious as the world pleases, provided it be granted that a man of real eloquence would receive the praise given to them as an insult.

8. Still it must be allowed that learning does take away something, as the file takes something from rough metal, the whetstone from blunt instruments, and age from wine ; but it takes away what is faulty ; and that which learning has polished is less only because it is better.

9. But such pleaders try by their delivery to gain the reputation of speaking with energy ; for they bawl on every occasion and bellow out every thing *with uplifted hand, as*

* *Illud quoque alterum, quod est in elocutione ipsa, periculum, minus vitat.*] Spalding says that by *alterum periculum* is meant the *other sense* of the word danger, that is, the figurative sense, it being used here metaphorically, distinct from "*verum periculum*," real danger. He should rather have said that we should understand Quintilian as referring to one kind of *periculum* which lies in the speaker's matter or thoughts, and which he incurs *maledicendo*, sect. 4 ; and another kind which lies merely in his style of speaking, *in elocutione ipsa*, in which he is always aiming at something grand and striking. I. translate the first by "peril," and the second by "venturesomeness," as they cannot be both rendered by the same word in English Compare C. xi. sect. 3.

t De Orat. iii. 26. The reference was first discovered by Al. meloveen. Gesner justly observes that Quintilian alludes to the passage in jest.

they call it, raging like madmen with incessant action, panting and swaggering, and with every kind of gesture and movement of the head. 10. To clap the hands together, to stamp the foot on the ground, to strike the thigh, the breast, and the forehead with the hand, makes a wonderful impression on an audience of the lower order,* while the polished speaker, as he knows how to temper, to vary, and to arrange the several parts of his speech, so in delivery he knows how to adapt his action to every variety of complexion in what he utters ; and, if any rule appears to him deserving of constant attention, it would be that he should prefer always to be and to seem modest. But the other sort of speakers call that force which ought rather to be called violence.

11. But we may at times see not only pleaders, but, what is far more disgraceful, teachers, who, after having had some short practice in speaking, abandon all method and indulge in every kind of irregularity as inclination prompts them, and call those who have paid more regard to learning than themselves, foolish, lifeless, timid, weak, and whatever other epithet of reproach occurs to them. 12. Let me then congratulate them as having become eloquent without labour, without method, without study ; but let me, as I have long withdrawn from the duties of teaching and of speaking in the forum, because I thought it most honourable to terminate my career while my services were still desired, console my leisure in, meditating and composing precepts which I trust will be of use to young men of ability, and which, I am sure, are a pleasure to myself.

CHAPTER XIII.

Quintilian does not give rules from which there is no departure ; pleaders must act according to the requisitions of their subjects, 1-7. What an orator has chiefly to keep in view, and how far rules should be observed, 8-17.

I. BUT let no man require from me 'such a system of precepts as is laid down by most authors of *books of rules, a*

• *Mire ad pullatum circum facit.*] The colour or dirt of the *toga*, and still more of the *tunica*, which many of the poor wore without anything over it, characterizes a multitude of the lower and uneducated class. of people. So Plin. Ep. vii. 17: *111os quoque sordidos a pullatos reveremur.* See Quint. vi. 4, 6. *Spalding.*

system in which I should have to make certain laws, fixed by immutable necessity, for all students of eloquence, commencing with the *proemium*, and what must be the character of it, saying that the *statement of facts* must come next, and what rule must be observed in stating them; that after this must come the *proposition*, or as some have preferred to call it, the *excursion*;^{*} and then that there must be *a certain order of questions*; adding also other precepts, which some speakers observe as if it were unlawful to do otherwise, and as if they were acting under orders; Q. for rhetoric would be a very easy and small matter, if it could be included in one short body of rules, but rules must generally be altered to suit the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, and necessity itself; consequently, one great quality in an orator is discretion, because he must turn his thoughts in various directions, according to the different bearings of his subject.

3. What if you should direct a general, that, whenever he draws up his troops for battle, he must range his front in line, extend his wings to the right and left, and station his cavalry to defend his flanks? Such a method will perhaps be the best, as often as it is practicable; but it will be subject to alteration from the nature of the ground, if a hill come in the way, if a river interpose, if obstruction be caused by declivities, woods, or any other obstacles: 4. the character of the enemy, too, may make a change necessary, or the nature of the contest in which he has to engage; and he will have to fight, sometimes with his troops in extended line, sometimes in the form of wedges, and to employ, sometimes his auxiliaries, and sometimes his own legions; and sometimes it will be of advantage to turn his back in pretended flight. 5. In like manner, whether an exordium be necessary or superfluous, whether it should be short or long, whether it should be wholly addressed to the judge, or, by the aid of some figure of speech, directed occasionally to others, whether the statement of facts should be concise or copious, continuous or broken, in the order of events or in any other, the nature of the causes themselves must show. 6. The case is the same with regard to the order of examination, since, in the same cause, one question may often be of advantage to one side, and another question to the other, to be asked first; for the precepts of oratory are not

* See b. iv. c. 3, 4.

established by laws or public decrees; but whatever is contained in them was discovered by expediency. 7. Yet I shall not deny that it is in general of service to attend to rules, or I should not write any; but if expediency shall suggest anything at variance with them, we shall have to follow it, deserting the authority of teachers.

8. For my part I shall, above all things,

Direct, enjoin, and o'er and o'er repeat,*

that an orator, in all his pleadings, should keep two things in view, *what is becoming*, and *what is expedient*; but it is frequently *expedient*, and sometimes *becoming*, to make some deviations from the regular and settled order, as, in statues and pictures, we see the dress, look, and attitude, varied. 8. In a statue, *exactly* upright, there is but very little gracefulness, for - the face will look straight forward, the arms hang down, the feet will be joined, and the whole figure, from top to toe, will be rigidity itself; but a gentle bend, or, to use the expression, motion of the body, gives a certain animation to figures. Accordingly, the hands are not always placed in the same position, and a thousand varieties are given to the countenance. 10. Some figures are in a running or rushing posture, some are seated or reclining, some are uncovered, and others veiled, some partake of both conditions. What is more distorted and elaborate than the Discobolus of Myron? + Yet if any one should find fault with that figure for not being upright, would he not prove himself void of all understanding of the art, in which the very novelty and difficulty of the execution is what is most deserving of praise? 11. Such graces and charms rhetorical figures afford, both such as are in the thoughts and such as lie in words, for they depart in some degree from the right line, and exhibit the merit of deviation from common practice. 12. The whole face is generally represented in a painting, yet Apelles painted the figure of Antigonus with only one side of

* A verse from Virgil, *En. iii. 436. Prædicam, et repetens iterumque iterumque monebo, prædicam* being purposely changed by Quintilian into *præcipiam*.

fi. Quintilian had some notion of the waving line of beauty, of which Hogarth has so ably treated.

§ See Plin. H. N. xiv. 19. Lucian Philopseud. vol. vii. p. 268, ed. Bip.

his face towards the spectator, that its disfigurement from the loss of an eye might be concealed. Are not some things, in like manner, to be concealed in speaking, whether, it may be, because they ought not to be told, or because they cannot be expressed as they deserve ? 13. It was in this way that Timanthes, a painter, I believe, of Cythnus,* acted, in the picture by which he carried off the prize from Colotes, of Teium ; for when, at the sacrifice of Iphigenia, he had represented Calchas looking sorrowful, Ulysses more sorrowful, and had given to Menelaus the utmost grief that his art could depict, not knowing, as his power of representing feeling was exhausted, how he could fitly paint the countenance of the father, he threw a veil over his head, and left his grief to be estimated by the spectator from his own heart. 14. To this device is not the remark of Sallust somewhat similar, *For I think it better to say nothing concerning Carthage, than to say but little?* For these reasons it has always been customary with me, to bind myself as little as possible to rules which the Greeks call *xadoXixca*, and which we, translating the word as well as we can, term *universalia* or *perpetualia*, " general " or " constant ;" for rules are rarely found of such a nature, that they may not be shaken in some part, or wholly overthrown.

But of rules I shall speak more fully, and of each in its own place. 15. In the mean time, I would not have young men think themselves sufficiently accomplished, if they have learned by art some one of those little books on rhetoric, which are commonly handed about, and fancy that they are thus safe under the decrees of theory. The art of speaking depends on great labour, constant study, varied exercise, repeated

* *Timanthca, opihor, Cythnius.*] See Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36; Cie. Orat. c. 22; Val. Max. viii. 11, ext. But it has been justly observed that the painter took the hint from Euripides, Iphig. An]. 15.10. *Spalding.* What Euripides says is, that "Agamemnon, when he saw Iphigenia going to be sacrificed, uttered a groan, and, turning away his head, shed tears, veiling his face with his robe." Spalding remarks that the doubt implied in *opinor* refers to the country of Timanthes, Quintilian not being certain whether he was a Cythnian or not; though why Quintilian should have been so anxious to avoid error about the painter's country, when he was merely making a passing observation on his picture, it is not easy to say. For further particulars about Timanthes and his painting, the reader may consult Smith's Diett of hog. and Mythol.

trials, the deepest sagacity, and the readiest judgment. 16. But it is assisted by rules, provided that they point out a fair road, and not one single wheel-rut, from which lie who' thinks it unlawful to decline, must be contented with the slow progress of those who walk on ropes. Accordingly, we often quit the main road, (which has been formed perhaps by the labour of an army,) being attracted by a shorter path ; or if bridges, broken down by torrents, have intersected the direct way, we are compelled to go round about ; and if the gate be stopped up by flames, we shall have to force a way through the wail. 17. The work of eloquence is extensive and of infinite variety, presenting something new almost daily; nor will all that is possible ever have been said of it. But the precepts which have been transmitted to us I will endeavour to set forth, considering, at the same time, which of them are the most valuable, whether anything in them seems likely to be changed for the better, and whether any additions may be made to them, or anything taken from them.

CHAPTER XIV.

Of the term rhetoric or oratory, § 1-4. Heads under which Quintilian considers the art of oratory, 5.

1. SOME who have translated *-vrog xil* from Greek into Latin, have called it *ars oratoria* and *oratrix*. I would not deprive those writers of their due praise, for endeavouring to add to the copiousness of the Latin language, but all Greek words do not obey our will, in attempting to render them from the Greek, as all our words, in like manner, do not obey those of the Greeks, when they try to express something of ours in their own tongue. 2. This translation is not less harsh than the *essentia* and *entia* of Flavius,*- for the Greek *ουβια*: nor is

* It is probable that he is the same person whom writers in general call Papirius Fabianus, a contemporary of Seneca, a philosopher well acquainted with the nature of things, as he is called by Plin. H. N. xxxvi. 24. Both the Senecas, father and son, say a great deal of him, the one in the Pref. Controv. ii. p. 132-134 ; the other in the Epist. ad Lucil. 101). *Spalding.* But from Sen. Ep. 58, it appears, according to the emendation of duretus, now generally adopted, that Cicero had previously used the word. Compare Quint. viii. 3, 53.

it indeed exact, for *oratoria* will be taken in the same sense as *elocutoria*, *oratrix* as *elocutrix*, but the word *rhétorice*, *o*, which we are speaking, is the same sort of word as *eloquentia*, and it is doubtless used in two senses by the Greeks. 3. In one 'acceptation it is an adjective, *ars rhétorica*, as. *navis piratica*: in the other a substantive, like *philosophia* or *-amz-citia*. We wish it now to have the signification of a substantive, just as *yaht,uar,x*, is rendered by the substantive *literatura*, not by *literatrix*, which would be similar to *oratrix*, nor by *literatoria*, which would be similar to *oratoria*; but for the word *rhétorice*, no equivalent Latin word has been found. 4. Let us not, however, dispute about the use of it, especially as we must adopt many other Greek words ; for if I may use the terms *physicus*, *musicus*, *geometres*, I shall offer no unseemly violence to them by attempting to turn them into Latin ; and since Cicero himself uses a Greek title for the books which he first wrote upon the art, we certainly need be under no apprehension of appearing to have rashly trusted the greatest of orators as to the name of his own art.

RHETORIC, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections,) will be best divided, in my opinion, in such a manner, that we may speak first of the *art*, next of the *artist*, and then of the *work*. The *art* will be that which ought to be attained by study, and is the *knowledge how to speak well*. The *artificer* is he who has thoroughly acquired the art, that is, the orator, whose business is *to speak well*. The *work* is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, *good speaking*. All these are to be considered under special heads ; but of the particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their several places ; at present I shall proceed to consider what **is to be said on the** first general head.

CHAPTER IV.

What rhetoric is, § 1, 2. To call it *the power of persuading* is t'd give an insufficient definition of it, 3-9. To call it *the power of persuading by speech* is not sufficient, 10, 11. Other definitions, 12-23. That of Gorgias in Plato ; that of Plato or Socrates in the Phaedrus, 21-31. That of Cornelius Celsus, 32. Other definitions more approved by Quintilian, 33-37. Quintilian's own definition, 38.

1. First of all, then, we have to consider what rhetoric is. It is, indeed, defined in various ways ; but its definition gives rise chiefly to two considerations, for the dispute is, in general, either concerning the *quality of the thing itself*, or concerning the comprehension of the terms in which it is defined. The first and chief difference of opinion on the subject is, that some think it possible even for bad men to have the name of orators ; while others (to whose opinion I attach myself) maintain that the name, and the art of which we are speaking, can be conceded only to good men.*

2. Of those who separate the talent of speaking from the greater and more desirable praise of a good life, some have called rhetoric merely *a power*, some *a science*, but not a virtue, some a *habit*, some an art, but having nothing in common with science and virtue; some even an abuse of art, that is, *a xaxorE7 via*; 3. All these have generally supposed, that the business of oratory lies either in *persuading*, or in *speaking in a manner adapted to persuade*, for such art may be attained by one who is far from being a good man. The most common definition therefore is, that *oratory is the power of persuading*. What I call *a power*, some call *a faculty*, and others a *talent*, but that this discrepancy may be attended with no ambiguity,

* This was the opinion also of Cato the Censor, given in his book *De Oratore* addressed to his son, as appears from Seneca the fatho., Proof. ad Controv. 1. i., a remarkable passage, and worthy of attention from the studious. *Orator est, Marce fili, vir bonus dicendi peritus*. Antonius, in Cie. De Orat. ii. 20, distinguishes the orator from the good man, as does also Cicero himself, Invent. i. 3, 4. See Quintilian iii. 1, 1 ; and Procem. tot. op. sect. 9. *bpalding*.

+ See c. 20.

+ We call that art a *KaKOrIXvia* which has not a good, but a bad end, as the magic art ; and some abuse oratory to the hurt of thoit fellow creatures. *Turnchus*.

I mean by *power, duva, u, rs.* 4. This opinion had its origin from Isocrates, if the treatise on the art, which is in circulation under his name, is really his.* That rhetorician, though he had, none of the feelings of those who defame the business of the orator, gives too rash a definition of the art when he says, "That rhetoric is the *worker of persuasion, ru0o:s dr;p ovgyos-* for I shall not allow myself to use the peculiar term that Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus, *SUADA medulla.* 5. In Plato too, Gorgias, in the Dialogue inscribed with his name, says almost the same thing; but Plato wishes it to be received as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero, in several passages of his writings, has said, that the duty of an orator is to speak in a way adapted to persuade. 6. In his books on Rhetoric also, but with which, doubtless, he was not satisfied,§ he makes the end of eloquence to be *persuasion.*

But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, and interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an opinion. 7. Thus when Antonius, in his defence of Manius Aquilius, exhibited on his breast, by tearing his client's robe, the scars of the wounds which he had received for his country, he did not trust to the power of his eloquence, but applied force, as it were, to the eyes of the Roman people, who, it was thought, were chiefly induced by the sight to

* The treatise of Isocrates Cicero (de Invent. ii. 2) intimates that he had not seen. There is a learned discussion of Manutius concerning it in a note on Epist. ad Div. i. 9. He conjectures that there may have been a treatise of Isocrates the younger, of Apollonia, a disciple of the greater Isocrates, mentioned by Harpocration (in Eira, cros) and Suidas. See Ruhnck. Hist. Crit. Oratt. Groecc. prefixed to Rutilius Lupus, p. 84, seqq. Spalding.

† *Declinatione.*] That is, the peculiar form of derivative from the primitive *suadco.* See viii. 3. 32; and Varro L. L. lib. v. p. 61, ed. Bip. Capperonier.

De Orat. i. 31; Quast. Acad. i. 8; De Invent. i. 5, *init.*

§ He shows his dissatisfaction with his *Rhetorica*, or books *de Inventione*, "*qui sibi exciderint*," Orat. i. 2, *init.* See Quint. iii. 1, 20; iii. 6, 58, 63. Spalding.

|| Spalding's text has *quo*, but I have adopted *quum*, which he supposes, in his note, to be the true reading, referring to Drakenborch ad Liv. xxiv. 34, where it is shown that *quo* and *quum*, or *quom*, are often confounded.

acquit the accused. 8. That Servius Galba* escaped merely through the pity which he excited, when he not only produced his own little children before the assembly, but carried round in his hands the son of Sulpicius Gallus, is testified, not only by the records of others, but by the speech of Cato. 9. Phryue too, people think, was freed from peril, not by the pleading of Hyperides, though it was admirable, but by the exposure of her figure, which, otherwise most striking, lie had uncovered by opening her robe. If, then, all such things *persuade*, the definition of which we have spoken is not satisfactory.

10. Those, accordingly, have appeared to themselves more exact, who, though they have the same general opinion as to rhetoric, have pronounced it to be the *power of persuading by speaking.* This definition Gorgias gives, in the Dialogue which we have just mentioned, being forced to do so, as it were, by Socrates. Theodectes, if the treatise on rhetoric, which is inscribed with his name, is his, (or it may rather, perhaps, as has been supposed, be the work of Aristotle,) does not dissent from Gorgias, for it is asserted in that book, that the object of oratory is *to lead men by speaking to that which the speaker wishes.* U. But not even this definition is sufficiently comprehensive; for not only the orator, but others, as harlots, flatterers, and seducers, persuade, or *lead to that which they wish*, by speaking. But the orator, on the contrary, does not always persuade; so that sometimes this is not his peculiar object; sometimes it is an object common to him with others, **who are** very different from orators. 12. Yet Apollodorus varies but little from this definition, as he says, that the first and supreme object of judicial pleading is *to persuade the judge, and to lead him to whatever opinion the speaker may wish*, for he thus subjects the orator to the power of fortune, so that, if he does not succeed in persuading, lie cannot retain the name of an orator. 13. Some, on the other hand, detach themselves from all considerations as to the event, as Aristotle,

"When he was praetor in Spain he had put to death a body of Lusitanians after pledging the public faith that their lives should be spared; an act for which he was accused before the people by the tribune Libo, who was supported, by Cato. Turnebus. See Cic. de Orat. i. 53.

† *Corruptores.*] Qui mares venantur. Spalding. Cic. Verr. iii. 2. Catil. ii. 4. Not *bribers*, for they seduce with money, not with words.

who says, that oratory is the power of finding out whatever, can persuade in speaking.* But this definition has not only the fault of which we have just spoken, but the additional one of comprehending nothing but invention, which, without elocution, cannot constitute oratory. 14. To Hermagoras, who says, that the object of oratory is to speak persuasively, and to others, who express themselves to the same purpose, though not in the same words, but tell us that the object of oratory is to say all that ought to be said in order to persuade, a sufficient answer was given when we showed that to persuade is not the business of the orator only.

15. Various other opinions have been added to these, for some have thought that oratory may be employed about all subjects, others only about political affairs, but which of these notions is nearer to truth, I shall inquire in that part of my work which will be devoted to the question. 16. Aristotle seems to have put everything in the power of oratory when he says, that it is the power of saying on every subject whatever can be found to persuade : and such is the case with Patrocles,† who, indeed, does not add on every subject, but, as he makes no exception, shows that his idea is the same, for he calls oratory the power of finding whatever is persuasive in speaking, both which definitions embrace invention alone. Theodorus,§ in order to avoid this defect, decides oratory to be the power of discovering and expressing, with elegance, whatever is credible on any subject whatever. 17. But, while one who is not an orator may find out what is credible as well as what is persuasive, he, by adding on any subject whatever, grants more than the preceding makers of definitions, and allows the title of a most honourable art to those who may

‡ Toii O Wpitoac rb Ev3fXoqevov lrt0avov.

Rhet. j. 2, 1.

† Dicendi] Though this is the reading of all copies, Spalding justly observes that it cannot be right, as it is at variance with what is said in sect. 13, and that we ought to read *inveniendi* or something similar.

+ He is mentioned again, iii. 6, 44. Nothing more is known of him than is to be learned from these two passages.

§ I do not suppose him to be the same that is mentioned in sect. 21, or Quintilian would scarcely have added " of Gadara " when he mentioned him the second time, unless he had intended to distinguish the one from the other. We must suppose, therefore, that it is Theodorus of Byzantium who is meant ; a rhetorician mentioned by Plato Phaedr. p. 26) E, as well as by Quint. iii. 1, 11; and see Cie. Brut. c. 12 ; Orat. s. LL. Spalding.

persuade even to crime. 18. Gorgias, in Plato, calls himself a master of persuasion in courts of justice and other assemblies, and says that he treats both of what is just and what is unjust ; and Socrates allows him the art of persuading, 'but not of teaching.

19. Those who have not granted all subjects to the orator, have made distinctions in their definitions, as they were necessitated, with more anxiety and verbosity. One of these is Ariston, a disciple of Critolaus, the Peripatetic, whose definition of oratory is, that it is the science of discovering and expressing what ought to be said on political affairs, in language adapted to persuade the people. 20. He considers oratory a science, because he is a Peripatetic, not a virtue, like the Stoics,* but, in adding adapted to persuade the people, he throws dishonour on the art of oratory, as if he thought it unsuited to persuade the learned. But of all who think that the orator is to discourse only on political questions, it may be said, once for all, that many duties of the orator are set aside by them ; for instance, all laudatory speaking, which is the third part of oratory.} 21. Theodorus, of Gadara, (to

proceed with those who have thought oratory an art, not a virtue,) defines more cautiously, for he says, (let me borrow the words of those who have translated his phraseology from the Greek,) that oratory is an art that discovers, and judges, and enunciates with suitable eloquence, according to the measure of that which may be found adapted to persuading, in any subject connected with political affairs. 22. Cornelius Celsus, in like manner, says that the object of oratory is to speak persuasively on doubtful and political matters. To these de fi.

* Cicero, de Orat. iii. 18, says that the Stoics alone, of all the philosophers, have called eloquence virtue and wisdom ; see also Acad. Quest. i. 2. The Stoics necessarily held this opinion, as they also gave dialectics and physics the name of virtues, Cie. de Fin. iii. 21 ; and of dialectics, taken in its widest sense, oratory or rhetoric may be considered as a part. The Stoics, indeed, make the word *Eaiaritrq* the basis of all their definitions of virtues ; see Stob. Eclog. p. 167, ed. Anty. ; and virtue itself is defined by Musonius Rufus, the master of Epictetus, as knowledge not merely theoretical, but practical: Stob. Serm. p. 204, ed. Figur. If therefore the definition of eloquence in the text had proceeded from a Stoic, and not a Peripatetic, he would have acknowledged it to be a virtue by the very admission that it was knowledge. See c. 20 of this book. Spalding.

± The epideictic, the other two parts being the deliberative and the judicial.

nitions there are some, not very dissimilar, given by others, such as this : *oratory is the power of judging and discoursing on such civil questions as are submitted to it, with a certain persuasiveness, a certain action of the body, and a certain mode of delivering what it expresses.* 23. Their are a thousand other definitions, but either similar, or composed of similar elements, which we shall notice when we come to treat upon the subjects of oratory.

Some have thought it neither a *power*, nor a *science*, nor an *art*; Critolaus calls it the *practice of speaking*; (for such is the meaning of the word *T?rail*;) Athenaeus,* *the art of deceiving.* 24. But most writers, satisfied with reading a few passages from Plato's Gorgias,* unskilfully extracted by their predecessors, (for they neither consult the whole of that dialogue, nor any of the other writings of Plato,) have fallen into a very grave error, supposing that that philosopher entertained such an opinion as to think that *oratory was not an art, but a certain skilfulness in flattering and pleasing*; 25. or, as he says in another place, the *simulation of one part of polity, and the fourth sort of flattery*, for he assigns two parts of polity to the body, *medicine*, and, as they interpret it, *exercise*, and two to the mind, *law* and *justice*, and then calls the *art of cooks* the flattery or simulation of *medicine*, and the *art of dealers in slaves* the simulation of the effects of *exercise*, as they produce a false complexion by paint and the appearance of strength by unsolid fat; the simulation of *legal science* he calls *sophistry*, and that of *justice rhetoric*. 26. All this is, indeed, expressed in that Dialogue, and uttered by Socrates, under whose person Plato seems to intimate what he thinks; but some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute those who argued on the other side, and are called *eXEYxrxof* others were written to teach, and are called *3oyaarixof*. 27. But Socrates, or **Plato**, thought that sort of oratory, which was then practised, to be of a dogmatic character, for he speaks of it as being *xaTU'ro"uiov r6y sgo'rov ov v,uel oroXrrEUE6SE,* § " according to the manner in which you manage public affairs,"

* He is mentioned again, iii. 1, 16. Nothing more is known of him than is to be learned from these two passages of Quintilian.

† It is strange that among those who said that oratory was neither a *power*, nor a *science*, nor an *art*, Quintilian should rank one who called it the "*art of deceiving.*" *Spalding*.

§ Plato Gorg. sect. 43, *aegq.* p. 462, ed. Steph.

¶ Sect. 120, p. 500 C.

and understands oratory of a sincere and honourable nature. The dispute with Gorgias is accordingly thus terminated : " It is therefore necessary that the orator be a just man, mild that the just man should wish to do just things."* 28. When this has been said, Gorgias is silent, but Polus resumes the subject, who, from the ardour of youth, is somewhat inconsiderate, and in reply to whom the remarks on simulation and flattery are made. Callicles, who is even more vehement, speaks next, but is reduced to the conclusion, that " he who would be a true orator must be a just man, and must know what is just ;"† and it is therefore evident, that oratory was not considered by Plato an evil, but that he thought true oratory could not be attained by any but a just and good man. 29. In the Phaedrus he sets forth still more clearly, that the art cannot be fully acquired without a knowledge of justice, an opinion to which I also assent. - Would Plato, if he had held any other sentiments, have written the Defence of Socrates, and the Eulogy of those who fell in defence of their country compositions which are certainly work for the orator? 30. But he has even inveighed against that class of men who used their abilities in speaking for bad ends. Socrates also thought the speech, which Lysias had written for him when accused, improper for him to use, though it was a general practice, at that time, to compose for parties appearing before the judges speeches which they themselves might deliver; and thus an elusion of the law,§ by which one man was not allowed to speak for another, was effected. 31. By Plato, also, those who separated oratory from justice, and preferred

* Sect. 35, p. 460 C.

† Sect. 13(1), p. 508 C.

‡ Plato wrote a funeral oration on some Athenians who had fallen in battle; a composition, says Cicero, which was so well received, that it was recited publicly on a certain day in every year. *Turnebus*.

§ Of this law I have found no mention in any other author, nor has any one of Quintilian's commentators paid due attention to this passage. That what he says is true, and that it was not customary at Athens for one man to speak for another, seems to be shown by the fact that in the works of the Greek orators the litigants always speak for themselves. The only exception was, when the litigant had not the privilege of speaking, as Callias, who was a *metec*, and for whom Lysias spoke; (see Lys. prat. v., and Wolf. Prol. in Lept, p. 69;) and persons under age, and women. *Spalding*. He adds a few more remarks, which the reader may consult.