

QUINTILIANUS
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~~QUINTILIAN'S~~

INSTITUTES OF ORATORY:

OR,

EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR.

IN TWELVE BOOKS.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED WITH NOTES

BY THE

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VOL. I.

LONDON: GEORGE BELL AND SONS, YORK STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.

1891.

W18-7652

PREFACE.

It was observed by Dr. Drake in his "Literary Hours," about fifty years ago, that no version of Quintilian at all adequate to the merits of the original existed in English, and that to translate him throughout with energy, spirit, and fidelity, would prove a task of the most arduous and difficult kind; such is the beauty of his diction, and such the peculiar propriety of his epithets.

The difficulties alleged by Dr. Drake are by no means exaggerated; and since his time no translator has applied himself to execute the task. The language of writers extremely nice in the choice of words and the collocation of phrases, is always difficult to render satisfactorily. What is graceful in the original can but seldom be made graceful in a version. But the present translator, if he has not entirely succeeded, hopes that he has no great cause to deprecate censure. He will only request that, should the student think some passages too freely rendered, he will bear in mind the necessity of endeavouring to satisfy the mere English reader; and that, if the English reader finds some passages too stiff, he will consider the necessity for a certain degree of closeness to answer the wants of the student.

Of the two translations which have previously appeared in English, those of Guthrie and Patsall, neither is complete, whole chapters being omitted in each. In regard to fidelity, Patsall is, on the whole, rather to be preferred; but neither

he nor Guthrie had the requisite scholarship to do justice to their author. When they could not ascertain the sense of a passage, they substituted some vague paraphrase or omitted it altogether.

In the following pages the whole of the original is translated, and the utmost care has been taken to observe an exact adherence to the sense. On every obscure or corrupt passage, illustration is given in a note. The text which has been used is that of Spalding, from whose valuable commentary much useful matter has been adopted.

J. S. W.

CONTENTS.

Quintilian to Trypho, wishing health. Page 1

QUINTILIAN'S PREFACE.

The object and intention of the work, § 1—3. To whom dedicated, 6. Unauthorized publications under the name of Quintilian, 7. The professions of the rhetorician and philosopher were formerly united, 9—16. The perfect orator, 17. Partition of the work, 21, 22. Further observations on teaching and speaking, 23—27 . 2

BOOK I.

- CH. I. Remarks on the capacities of boys in general, § 1—3. Of nurses, 4, 5. Of parents, slaves, and *pædagogæ*, 6—11. Of learning Greek and Latin, 12—14. Of the proper age for beginning to learn, 15—19. Of the proper method of teaching children, 20—24. Of learning the alphabet, and of writing, 25—29. Of learning to read, of subjects for writing, of learning by heart, and of improving the pronunciation, 30—37 9
- CH. II. Considerations on public and private education; public education to be preferred; alleged corruption of morals in public schools; equal corruption at home, § 1—8. Reply to the objection that a pupil receives less attention from a master in a school than from a domestic tutor, 9—16. Emulation, friendship, incitements to masters and pupils, and other advantages of public education, 17—31 18
- CH. III. Disposition and abilities of a pupil to be ascertained, § 1—3. Precociousness not desirable, 3—5. On the management of pupils, 6, 7. On relaxation and play, 8—13. On corporal punishment, 14—18 25
- CH. IV. Of grammar, § 1—6. Remarks on certain letters and derivations of words, 7—12. Changes in words, 13—17. Of the parts of speech, 18—21. Some observations on nouns and verbs, 22—29 28
- CH. V. Necessity of correctness in speaking and writing, § 1. On single words, 2, 3. Choice of words, 4. Barbarisms, 5—10. Barbarisms in poets and other writers, 11—17. Faults in pronunciation, 17, 18. On the aspiration, 19—21. The accents, 22—24. On ending a word with an acute accent, 25—30. Legitimate accentuation,

- 31—33. On the solecism, 34—37. Different kinds of solecisms, 38—41. No dual number in Latin, 42—44. Solecisms in various parts of speech, 45—51. Figures of speech, 52—54. On foreign words, 55—57. Greek words, 58—64. Compound words, 65—70. Words proper, metaphorical, common, new, 71, 72 . . . Page 37
- CH. VI. Of language, § 1—3. Analogy, 4—11. Departures from it, 12—27. Etymology, 28—33. Abuses of it, 34—38. Old words, 39—41. Authority, 42. Custom, 43—45 54
- CH. VII. Of orthography, § 1. Distinction of words of doubtful signification, 2—6. Composition with prepositions, 7—9. On the letter *k*, 10. Orthography subservient to custom; antique spelling, 11—27. Difference between spelling and pronunciation, 28, 29. Necessity of judgment, 30—32. Quintilian defends his remarks on this subject, 33—35 64
- CH. VIII. Of reading, § 1—4. Authors to be read, Greek and Latin, 4—12. Duty of the grammarian, 13—17. Of lectures on historical reading, 18—21 70
- CH. IX. Commencement of composition, § 1. *Æsop's* fables, 2. Sentences, *chria*, *ethologia*, 3, 4. Narratives from the poets, 5 . . . 75
- CH. X. Of other studies preliminary to that of rhetoric, § 1. Necessity of them, 2—8. Authority of the ancients in favour of learning music, 9—16. Union of music with grammar, 17—21. Utility of music to the orator, 22—30. What sort of music to be studied, 31—33. Utility of geometry, 34—37. Geometrical proof, 38—45. Astronomy; examples of the benefit attending a knowledge of it, 46—49 77
- CH. XI. Instruction to be received from the actor, § 1—3. He should correct faults of pronunciation, 4—8. He should give directions as to look and gesture, 9—11. Passages from plays should be recited by the pupil, 12, 13. Passages also from speeches, 14. Exercises of the *palæstra* to be practised, 15—19 88
- CH. XII. No fear to be entertained lest boys should be engaged in too many studies, if judgment be used; examples of the number of things to which the human mind can attend at once, § 1—7. Boys endure study with spirit and patience, 8—11. Abundance of time for all necessary acquirements, 12—15. Unreasonable pretexts for not pursuing study, 16—19 91

BOOK II.

- CH. I. Boys are not put under the professor of rhetoric early enough; reasons why they should begin to receive instruction from him at an earlier age, § 1—3. The professions of the grammarian and teacher of rhetoric should be in some degree united, 4—13 . . . 96

- CH. II. Choice of a teacher, § 1—4. How the teacher should conduct himself towards his pupils, 5—8. How the pupils should behave, 9—13. Some additional observations, 14, 15 Page 99
- CH. III. A pupil should be put under an eminent teacher at first, not under an inferior one, § 1—3. Mistakes of parents as to this point, 3, 4. The best teacher can teach little things best, as well as great ones, 5—9. The pupils of eminent teachers will afford better examples to each other, 10—12 102
- CH. IV. Elementary exercises, § 1. Narratives, or statements of facts, 2—4. Exuberance in early compositions better than sterility, 4—8. A teacher should not be without imagination, or too much given to find fault with his pupil's attempts, 8—14. The pupil's compositions should be written with great care, 15—17. Exercises in confirmation and refutation, 18, 19. In commendation and censure of remarkable men, 20—21. Common places, 22—23. Theses, 24, 25. Reasons, 26. Written preparations for pleadings, 27—32. Praise and censure of particular laws, 33—40. Declamations on fictitious subjects a later invention, 41, 42 105
- CH. V. Advantages of reading history and speeches, § 1—3. On what points in them the professor of rhetoric should lecture, 4—9. Faulty composition may sometimes be read, to exercise the pupil's judgment, 10—13. Usefulness of this exercise, 14—17. Best authors to be read at an early age, 18—20. The pupil should be cautious of imitating very ancient or very modern writers, 21—26 114
- CH. VI. In composition, the pupil should have but moderate assistance, not too much or too little 119
- CH. VII. Pupils should not always declaim their own compositions, but sometimes passages from eminent writers 121
- CH. VIII. Variety of talent and disposition in pupils requires variety of treatment, § 1—5. How far an inclination for any particular line of study should be encouraged and cultivated, 6—15 . . . 122
- CH. IX. Pupils should regard their tutors as intellectual parents . . . 125
- CH. X. Remarks on declamations, § 1, 2. Injudiciousness in the choice of subjects has been an obstruction to improvement in eloquence, 3—5. On what sort of subjects pupils may be permitted to declaim, 6—8. What alterations should be made in the common practice, 9—15 126
- CH. XI. Some think instruction in oratory unnecessary, § 1, 2. Boasts and practices of the ignorant, 3—5. Some study only parts of their speeches; want of connexion in their matter, 6—7 . . . 128

- CH. XII. Why the ignorant often seem to speak with more force than the learned, § 1—3. They attack more boldly, and are less afraid of failure, 4, 5. But they cannot choose judiciously, or prove with effect, 6. Their thoughts sometimes striking, 7. Apparent disadvantages of learned polish, 8. Unlearned speakers often vigorous in delivery, 9, 10. Occasionally too much admired by teachers of oratory, 11, 12 Page 131
- CH. XIII. Quintilian does not give rules from which there is no departure; pleaders must act according to the requisitions of their subjects, § 1—7. What an orator has chiefly to keep in view, and how far rules should be observed, 8—17 133
- CH. XIV. Of the term rhetoric or oratory, § 1—4. Heads under which Quintilian considers the art of oratory, 5 137
- CH. XV. What rhetoric is, § 1, 2. To call it *the power of persuading* is to give an insufficient definition of it, 3—9. To call it *the power of persuading by speech* is not sufficient, 10, 11. Other definitions, 12—23. That of Gorgias in Plato; that of Plato or Socrates in the *Phædrus*, 24—31. That of Cornelius Celsus, 32. Other definitions more approved by Quintilian, 33—37. Quintilian's own definition, 38 139
- CH. XVI. Oratory said by some to be a pernicious art, because it may be perverted to bad ends, § 1—4. We might say the same of other things that are allowed to be beneficial, 5, 6. Its excellences, 7—16. The abundant return that it makes for cultivation, 17—19 147
- CH. XVII. Oratory is manifestly an art, § 1—4. Yet some have denied that it is, and said that its power is wholly from nature, 5—8. Examples from other arts, 9, 10. Every one that speaks is not an orator, 11—13. Opinion of Aristotle, 14. Other charges against oratory; that it has no peculiar subject or matter, and that it sometimes deceives, 15—18. Refutation of these charges, 19—21. Unfairly objected to it that it has no proper end, 22—26. Not pernicious because it sometimes misleads, 27—29. Another objection, that it may be exerted on either side of a question, and that it contradicts itself; answered, 30—36. Oratory is sometimes ignorant of the truth of what it asserts; but the same is the case with other arts and sciences, 36—40. Confirmation of its being an art, 41—43 151
- CH. XVIII. Arts or sciences are of three kinds; rhetoric is a practical art or science, § 1, 2. Partakes of the nature of arts of other kinds, 3—5 159
- CH. XIX. Nature and art; nature contributes more to oratory, in students of moderate ability, than art; in those of greater talent, art is of more avail; an example 169

- CH. XX. Whether rhetoric be a *virtue*, as some call it, § 1—4. Proofs of this according to the philosophers, 5—7. Other proofs, 8—10 Page 161
- CH. XXI. Opinions as to the subject of rhetoric, § 1—4. That of Quintilian, which agrees with those of Plato and Cicero, 5, 6. Objections to it noticed, 7—11. No dispute between rhetoric and philosophy about their respective subjects, 12, 13. The orator not obliged to know everything, 14, 15. He will often speak better on arts than the artists themselves, 16—19. The opinion of Quintilian supported by those of other authors, 20—23 165

BOOK III.

- CH. I. Quintilian proposes to consider the various branches and precepts of oratory more fully than they are generally set forth in treatises on the art; a part of his work more desirable for students than agreeable to them, § 1—4. Diversities of opinions and methods, 5—7. Various writers on the art; the Greeks, 8—15. Followers of Hermagoras, Apollodorus, Theodorus, 16—18. The Romans, 19—21. Quintilian will give his own opinion on matters as they occur, 22 170
- CH. II. Of the origin of oratory, § 1, 2. Nature and art, 3. Objection to Cicero's notion, 4 176
- CH. III. Divisions of the art of Oratory, § 1—3. Various opinions respecting them, 4, 5. Cicero's not always the same, 6, 7. Opinions of some Greek writers, 8, 9. Of the order of the division or parts, 10. Whether they should be called parts, or works, or elements, 11 177
- CH. IV. Whether there are three sorts of oratory, or more, § 1—3. Quintilian adheres to the old opinion that there are but three; his reasons, 4—8. Opinions of Anaximenes, Plato, Isocrates, 9—11. Quintilian's own method, 12—15. He does not assign particular subjects to each kind, 16 180
- CH. V. Division into things and words; other divisions, § 1—3. Questions concerning what is written and what is not written, 4. Definite and indefinite questions, 5—7. Species of indefinite ones, 8—11. Questions on general subjects not useless, 12—16. Definition of a cause, 17, 18 183
- CH. VI. Of the *status* or *state* of a cause, § 1—4. What it is, 5—12. From whom the *state* proceeds, the accuser or defendant, 13—21. How many *states* there are; the ten categories of Aristotle, 22—24. Others make nine, others seven, 25—28. As to the number of *states*, some make one only, 29, 30. Others two, as Archidemus, Pamphilus, Apollodorus, Theodorus, Posidonius, Cornelius Celsus,

31—38. Another mode of making two *states*, 40—43. Most authors make three, as Cicero, Patrocles, Marcus Antonius, Virginius, 44—46. Athenæus, Cæcilius, and Theon make four, 45—48. The quadripartite methods of Aristotle and Cicero, 49, 50. Some have made five, six, seven, eight *states*, 51—54. Distinction of *status rationales, questiones legales*, 55—57. Cicero speaks of a *status negotialis*, 58, 59. Hermagoras first introduced *exception*, 60. Legal questions; Albutius, 61, 62. Quintilian departs in some degree from the method which he formerly adopted, 63—67. His opinion of *exception*: remarks upon it, 68—79. In every cause there are three points to be ascertained, 80—82. A fourfold division, useful to learners, 83—85. These four points included under two *genera*, the *rationale* and the *legale*, 86, 87. Resemblances in the *genus legale* spring from the three points above-mentioned. 88—90. In every simple cause there is but one *state*, 91—93. In complex causes there are several *states*, either of the same or of different kinds; examples, 94—104. Page 188

CH. VII. O panegyric or laudatory eloquence; not wholly distinct from practical discussion, § 1, 2. An orator does not always speak on doubtful points, 3, 4. Panegyric sometimes requires proof and defence, and very frequently amplification, 5, 6. Praise of the gods, 7—9. Praise of men more varied, 10, 11. Men extolled for personal endowments and fortunate circumstances, 12—14. For mental qualifications, 15, 16. For memorials which they leave of themselves, 17, 18. In censure the case is reversed, 19—21. On praise of the living, 22. It makes a difference where a panegyric is delivered, 23, 24. Advantage may be taken by the orator of the proximity of certain virtues to certain vices, 25. Praise of cities, places, public works, 26, 27. What *state* most prevailed in this department of oratory, 28. 218

CH. VIII. Deliberative oratory not confined to questions of utility, § 1. Whether nothing is useful but what is honourable, 2, 3. Deliberative oratory not concerned wholly with the *state* of quality, 4, 5. What kind of exordium requisite in it, 6—9. Statement of facts, 10, 11. The passions to be moved, 12, 13. Whether it solely concerns affairs of government, 14. That a thing can be done, is either certain or uncertain, 17—21. The three topics of persuasion, 22—26. Some do not distinguish topics from divisions of topics, 27, 28. The pleasing, the useful, and the honourable, 29—35. Use of examples, 36, 37. How things that are honourable may be recommended, and sometimes such as are at variance with honour, 38—47. Authority of the speaker, 48. *Prosopopeia*, 49—51. In the schools deliberative subjects have a great resemblance to controversies, 52—57. An error into which declaimers fall, 58—66. Advantage of reading history, 67—70. 224

CH. IX. Of judicial oratory, the departments of it often injudiciously increased; the proper number is five, § 1—6. The order to be observed in speaking and writing, 7—9. 240

CH. X. A cause rests either on one point of controversy, or on several; on points of the same or of different kinds, § 1, 2. Comparison, 3, 4. We must first settle the kind of cause; what points are to be considered next, 5. Page 242

CH. XI. Hermagoras's method of proceeding; the question, § 1—3. The mode of defence, 4—6. The point for decision, 7, 8. The ground or substance of the cause, 9. The question and the point for decision may be conjoined or separate, according to the nature of the cause, 10—17. Opinion of Cicero, 18—20. Hermagoras too fond of nice subdivisions, 21—25. Method of Theodorus, 26, 27. Conclusion, 28. 244

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

The grandsons of the sister of Domitian committed to the tuition of Quintilian; a new motive for care in composing his work. He proceeds to speak of the exordium of a speech, the statement of facts, the proof, the refutation of adverse allegations, and the peroration. 251

CH. I. Etymology of the word *proem*, § 1—3. An erroneous practice in the schools and in the forum, 4. Object of the *proem* or exordium, 5. How the good will and attention of the judge may be gained by allusion to different characters concerned in the cause, 6—19. Farther observations on the same subject, 20—27. Difference between the exordium and the conclusion, 28, 29. Matters connected with the characters and the cause to be considered, 30—32. Solicitude to be shown by the pleader; brevity to be promised; accurate division of matter to be made, 33—36. To conciliate the judge must be the pleader's constant object throughout his speech, 37—39. Five kinds of causes, 40—41. Some make two purposes of a *proem*, proposition and insinuation; the latter more easy for the advocate than for his client, 42—49. An unnecessary rule of the Apollodoreans, 50, 51. Points to be regarded in the exordium, 52—60. The speaker's memory must not fail him in it, 61. Its length must be proportioned to the cause, 62. Whether *apostrophe*, and other figures of speech, may be used in it, 63—71. Whether a formal exordium is always necessary, 72—75. Mode of transition to the statement of facts, 76—79. 253

CH. II. Of the statement of facts; some make too nice distinctions respecting it, § 1—3. A formal statement not always necessary, 4—8. Those are mistaken who suppose that a statement is never necessary on the part of an accused person who denies the charge, 9—19. What the judge already knows may sometimes be stated, 20—23. The statement need not always immediately follow the exordium, 24—27. The practice of the schools injudiciously transferred to the forum, 28—30. The statements should be clear, brief, and

- credible, 31—35. Of clearness, 36—39. Of brevity, 40—47. Of credibility, 48—53. The statement of facts should prepare the judge for the proof of them, 54—60. Certain qualities have in judiciously been made peculiar to the statement, 61—65. A ridiculous direction that the statement should be omitted in a cause which is unfavourable to us, 66. Difficult points must be variously managed, according to the nature of the case, 67—74. In a conjectural cause we must make a statement, but with art and care, 75—81. We must sometimes divide our statement, and invert the order of occurrences, 82—87. Of fictitious statements, 88—93. Complexion of a statement, 94—100. How we must act if the facts be partly for us and partly against us, 101, 102. Apostrophe and other figures absurdly excluded from the statement, 103—115. The statement should be embellished with every grace of language, 116—124. Of authority in the pleader, 125—127. Of repetition, 128. Of the commencement and conclusion of the statement, 129—132 Page 272
- CH. III. Of digressions or excursions immediately after the statement, § 1—3. Not always unreasonable, 4—8. Some preparation often necessary before proceeding to proof, 9—11. Digressions may be made in any part of a speech, but those in the middle should be short, 12—17 301
- CH. IV. Of propositions preparatory to proof; not always necessary, § 1, 2. Sometimes very useful, 3, 4. Various kinds of propositions, and remarks on them, 5—9 304
- CH. V. Partition of our matter generally useful, § 1—3. When it should be omitted, 4—9. Examples from Cicero, 10—12. As to *states* of conjecture and quality, 13—17. Artifices that may be used, 18—21. Utility of partition, and the proper qualities of it, 22—28 307

BOOK V.

INTRODUCTION.

- Some rhetoricians have thought that the only duty of an orator is *to teach*; others have called this his chief duty. The necessity for this book 313
- CH. I. Inartificial proofs. Eloquence not inefficient in regard to them 314
- CH. II. Previous judgments. The authority of those who deliver them to be considered. Similitude in cases; how to be refuted . . 315
- CH. III. Of public report 317
- CH. IV. Of evidence exacted by torture 317

- CH. V. Of the refutation of written testimony Page 318
- CH. VI. On offering to take an oath, and receiving that of the opposite party, § 1, 2. Arguments on the subject, 3—5. Judgment of the experienced respecting it, 6 318
- CH. VII. Written evidence; how to be refuted, § 1, 2. Modes of proceeding with regard to witnesses that appear in person, 3—6. An intimate knowledge of the cause necessary, 7, 8. How voluntary witnesses should be produced, 9—11. Caution requisite in respect to them, 12—14. How a pleader must act with regard to a witness whom he knows to be adverse or favourable to the accused, 15—19. How he must act in regard to one whose disposition he does not know, 20, 21. Of the interrogation of witnesses, 22—32. Of the collision between written and oral testimony, 32—34. Of supernatural testimony, 35—37 320
- CH. VIII. Artificial proofs too much neglected, § 1—3. There are certain particulars common to all kinds of proofs, 4—7 . . 328
- CH. IX. Difference of signs, indications, or circumstantial evidence, from proofs, § 1, 2. Of conclusive signs or indications, 3—7. Inconclusive signs are of weight when supported by others, 8—11. Of mere appearances, 12—14. Of prognostics, 15, 16 . . . 330
- CH. X. Of the different names given to arguments among the Greeks and Latins, § 1—8. Various significations of the word argument, 9—11. In every cause there must be something that does not require proof, 12—14. Of credibilities, 15—19. Of sources from which arguments are drawn, 20—22. From the character of individuals, 23—31. From circumstances, as motives, place, time, manner, 32—48. Opportunities and means, 49—52. Arguments from definition, 53—61. Remarks on Cicero's method; argument and definition assisted by division, 62—70. Arguments from commencement, increase, and event, 71, 72. From dissimilitude, opposition, consequentiality, 73—79. From causes and effects, 80—85. From comparison, 86—89. Too many subdivisions under this head, 90—94. Arguments from supposition, 95—99. Precepts not to be followed too superstitiously; examples, 100—108. An orator must take care what he proposes to be proved; an example, 109—118. Utility of rules, 119—121. Necessity and advantages of study and practice, 122—125 . . 334
- CH. XI. Of examples and instances, § 1—5. Of the efficiency, and various species, of examples, 6—16. Of examples from the fables of the poets, 17, 18. From the fables of Æsop, and proverbs, 19—21. Comparison, 22—25. Caution necessary with respect to it, 26—29. Too much sub-division in it, 30, 31. Comparison of points of law, 32, 33. Analogy, 34, 35. Authority, 36—41. Authority of the gods, 42. Of the judge, and of the adverse party, 43. Examples and authority not to be numbered among inartificial proofs, 44 362

- CH. XII. How far we may use doubtful grounds of argument, § 1—3. Some arguments to be urged in a body, some singly, 4, 5. Some to be carefully supported, and referred to particular points in our case, 6, 7. Not to be too numerous, 8. Arguments from the characters of persons, 9—13. In what order arguments should be advanced, 14. Quintilian states summarily what others have given at greater length, 15—17. Argument too much neglected in the exercises of the schools, 17—23 . . . Page 373
- CH. XIII. Refutation twofold, § 1. Why it is more difficult to defend than to accuse, 2, 3. Deprecation not to be adopted without some ground of defence, 4—6. Nothing to be gained by silence in regard to matters that cannot be defended, 7—11. We may attack some of our adversary's arguments in a body, some singly, 12—14. What arguments may be easily refuted, 15, 16. What arguments of our adversary may be turned to our advantage, 17, 18. Many will fall under conjecture, definition, quality, 19—21. Some of the adversary's arguments may be treated as unworthy of notice, 22. Precedents, which he assumes to be applicable to his case, we must endeavour to prove inapplicable, 23, 24. We may repeat the statements of the adversary so as to weaken them, 25—27. We may sometimes expose the whole charge, sometimes particular parts of it, 28. How we make arguments common to both sides adverse to us; how discrepancies in the pleading of the adversary are to be exposed, 29—33. Some faults easily shown, 34, 35. Not to neglect arguments of our adversary, and not to be too anxious to refute them all, 36, 37. How far we should spare our adversary personally, 38—44. Some pleaders, in endeavouring to expose their adversaries, give occasion against themselves, 45—48. Sometimes, however, we may represent that there are contradictions in his statements, 49, 50. A pleader ought to appear confident of the justice of his cause, 51, 52. Order which we must observe in supporting our own arguments and refuting those of the opposite party, 53—55. We must support our proofs and refutations by the power of eloquence, 56—58. Foolish dispute between Theodorus and Apollodorus, 59, 60 . . . 379
- CH. XIV. Of the enthymeme and its parts, § 1—4. Of the epicheirema and its parts, 5—9. Not always of the same form, 10—13. The epicheirema of the orators is the syllogism of the philosophers, 14—16. All the parts of it not always necessary to be specified, 17—19. Three modes of opposing this form of argument, 20—23. How the enthymeme differs from the syllogism, 24—26. We must not crowd our speech with rhetorical forms of argument, 27—32. We must not leave our arguments unembellished, 33—35 . . . 394

BOOK VI.

INTRODUCTION.

Quintilian laments that his son, whose improvement, in conjunction with that of the sons of Marcellus and Cæsar, he had had in view in

- the composition of this work, had been carried off by death, § 1, 2. He had previously lost, during the composition of another work, a younger son, as well as his wife, 3—6. Abilities of which his children gave indications, 7—9. His grief; he intreats indulgence if, in consequence of it, he pursues his work with less spirit, 10—16 Page 403
- CH. I. Peroration of a speech; the objects of it; some think that it should consist wholly of recapitulation, § 1—8. Appeals to the feelings may be made by the accuser and the advocate alike, 9. What the exordium and the peroration have in common, and in what respects they differ, 10—14. The accuser excites the feelings either by showing the heinousness of the charge which he makes, or the pitiable condition of the party for whom he seeks redress, 15—20. What qualities excite feeling in favour of an accused person 21, 22. Solicitations for pity may have great effect, but should not be long, 23—28. Modes of exciting pity, 29—36. How persons who are introduced to move pity at the conclusion of a speech, should behave themselves, 37—43. No orator must attempt to draw tears from the judges unless he be a man of great ability, 44, 45. It is the part of the peroration to dispel compassionate emotions, as well as to excite them, 46—49. Perorations sometimes of a very mild character, 50. Appeals to the feelings may be made in other parts of a speech as well as in the peroration, 51—55 407
- CH. II. Necessity of studying how to work on the minds of the judges, § 1, 2. This department of oratory requires great ability, 3—7. Of *πάθος* and *ἦθος*, 8—24. If we would move others, we must feel moved ourselves, 25—28. Of presenting images to the imagination of our hearers, 29—35. Pupils should be exercised in this in the schools, 36 420
- CH. III. Of the power of exciting laughter in an audience, § 1. There was little of it in Demosthenes; perhaps a superabundance of it in Cicero, 2—5. Causes of laughter not sufficiently explained, 6, 7. Is of great effect, 8—10. Depends far more on nature and favourable circumstances than on art, 11—13. No instructions given in exciting laughter, 14—16. Various names for jocularity or wit, 17—21. Depends partly on matter, partly on words; subjects of it, 22—24. Laughter may be excited by some act, or look, or gesture, 25—27. What is becoming to the orator, 28—32. What to be avoided by him, 33—35. Topics for jesting, and modes of it, 36—46. Ambiguity in words, 47—56. The best jests are taken from things, not from words; of similarity, 57—62. Of dissimilarity, 63, 64. From all forms of argument arise occasions for jesting, 65, 66. Jest in the form of tropes and figures, 67—70. Of jocular refutation, 71—78. Of eluding a charge; of pretended confession, 79—81. Some kinds of jests are beneath an orator, 82, 83. Of deceiving expectation, 84—87. Of jocular imitation, 88. Of attributing thoughts to ourselves or others; and of irony,